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Abstract
Pirates are literally getting away with murder. Modern pirates are attacking vessels, hijacking
ships at gunpoint, taking hostages, and injuring and killing crew members.1 They are doing so with
increasing frequency. According to the International Maritime Bureau (“IMB”) Piracy Reporting
Center’s 2009 Annual Report, there were 406 pirate attacks in 2009—a number that has not been
reached since 2003. Yet, in most instances, a culture of impunity reigns whereby nations are not
holding pirates accountable for the violent crimes they commit. Only a small portion of those
people committing piracy are actually captured and brought to trial, as opposed to captured and
released. For example, in September 2008, a Danish warship captured ten Somali pirates, but then
later released them on a Somali beach, even though the pirates were found with assault weapons
and notes stating how they would split their piracy proceeds with warlords on land. Britain’s Royal
Navy has been accused of releasing suspected pirates,7 as have Canadian naval forces. Only very
recently, Russia released captured Somali pirates—after a high-seas shootout between Russian
marines and pirates that had attacked a tanker carrying twenty-three crew and US$52 million
worth of oil.9 In May 2010, the United States released ten captured pirates it had been holding for
weeks after concluding that its search for a nation to prosecute them was futile. In fact, between
March and April 2010, European Union (“EU”) naval forces captured 275 alleged pirates, but
only forty face prosecution. Furthermore, when pirates are tried, they are often tried by Kenya
or other African nations, rather than by the capturing nation. Kenya has entered into agreements
with Canada, China, Denmark, the European Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States
to try the pirates these nations capture. Mauritius, Seychelles, and Tanzania have executed similar
agreements to prosecute captured pirates. In an effort to aid prosecutions, Western states have
pledged money—about US $10 million since May 2009—to alleviate the strain on the “poorly
equipped and corrupt criminal justice system” and to cover the cost of transporting witnesses,
training police and prosecutors, and upgrading prisons and courts.16 In fact, in late June 2010,
the United Nations Office on Drug and Crimes (“UNODC”) used funds from donor nations to
help open a new high-security courtroom in Mombasa, Kenya to prosecute pirates.17 But why
are Western states refusing to prosecute pirates on their own soil even though they—more so than
less-developed nations—have the money and institutional capabilities to bring pirates to justice
in a swift and fair manner? After all, these states are providing Kenya and other African nations
with funds and support to help them conduct piracy trials. They are spending billions to support
the various naval patrols that are capturing pirates—but thereafter releasing them to continue their
criminal activities. While several reasons have been advanced to explain why nations may not be
regularly prosecuting pirates, one reason often given to explain the reluctance of Western nations
to try pirates on their own soil is the threat of asylum claims by convicted pirates. This reason has
been advanced by academics and government representatives, among others. Roger Middleton,
a researcher for Chatham House, the London-based think tank, explained it this way: “These
countries don’t want to be bombarded by claims of asylum from the pirates, who would ask not
to be deported to Somalia, a country at war.” In fact, in April 2008, the British Foreign Office
warned the Royal Navy that detaining pirates at sea could be a violation of their human rights and
could also lead to asylum claims by pirates seeking to relocate to Europe. A former Tory chairman
stated that ministers in Parliament had indicated privately that the reason captured pirates were not
being brought to Britain for trial (including the sixty-six suspected pirates captured by the Royal
Navy in 2009—all of whom were thereafter released) was because of fears those pirates might
seek asylum in the country. And at least some pirates have actually threatened to seek asylum
in theWest. Reports indicate that two of the pirates on trial for attacking a Dutch vessel have
declared their intention to try to stay on as residents. Nevertheless, although the threat of asylum
claims is frequently offered to explain Western nations’ reluctance to prosecute pirates in their
territories, what is not addressed is whether this fear has any actual basis in fact or law. Instead,
the statement that nations are afraid of asylum claims is followed by little explanation at all—and
certainly no legal analysis of the international or domestic laws on which convicted pirates would
base their claims for asylum. In any event, even if the fear of asylum claims is well-founded, is this
a reason to allow Western nations to avoid their duty to prosecute crimes that violate international
law? Although some pirates are being prosecuted, why should others get away with murder solely
because Western nations fear asylum claims? This Article is concerned with these issues and
examines international refugee law and international human rights law in an effort to determine the
likely viability of any asylum claims that may be brought by pirates convicted in the West. Based
on an analysis of the text of the main international treaties governing asylum and non-refoulement,
as well as interpretations of the provisions contained in those treaties, this Article concludes there
is little reason to believe that Western states would be required to grant refugee status (as that term
is defined in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees) to convicted pirates. Among
other things, pirates are not a group that is subject to persecution, and pirates have committed the
types of serious and violent crimes that should exclude them from claiming refugee status—and
thus, the residence and other benefits associated with being granted asylum. Second, states should
be able to legally expel or deport convicted pirates under international human rights treaties since
most pirates are likely unable to show they would face torture if expelled or returned to their
country of origin. Even if pirates could show they risk torture or other inhumane treatment upon
return, states may be able to satisfy their international obligations regarding non-refoulement and
return pirates if the state receives diplomatic assurances that the authorities would not resort to
such treatment. Furthermore, under the recent European Qualitative Directive, European Union
Member States are not required to grant benefits such as residence permits to individuals who have
committed serious and violent crimes, even though the European Convention on Human Rights
prohibits refoulement to face torture or other ill treatment. Finally, even if there is some risk
that some pirates can mount successful asylum or non-refoulement claims, the risk is one that
developed Western states should assume because of the greater good that will come from ensuring
that pirates are brought to justice (especially by way of fair trials and processes that respect human
rights).26 Developed nations risk asylum claims (by pirates and others) simply because they are
developed—a status that typically carries with it an expectation that the state will protect human
rights and enforce the rule of law. In this instance, enforcing the rule of law means that nations
must invoke universal jurisdiction or use the prohibitions contained in international treaties and
in their own domestic laws to prosecute violent and dangerous pirates even if it means they must
consider and adjudicate some additional asylum claims. Bringing to justice the pirates that commit
violent acts and disrupt international waters is a goal as worthy as numerous others where nations
accept the risk of asylum claims, and pirates are unlikely to be deterred from committing those
acts unless nations commit to end the current culture of impunity. Part I of this Article describes
the modern piracy problem, including the international law governing piracy, and the culture of
impunity that surrounds it. Part II provides a brief overview of the international law providing
protection for those seeking asylum, focusing on international refugee law as well as the primary
treaties under international human rights law that govern the transfer of persons and specifically
prohibit transfer to states where those persons would be subjected to torture or ill treatment. Parts
III and IV analyze international refugee law and international human rights law in the context
of potential claims by convicted pirates seeking asylum and protection against nonrefoulement.
The Article concludes by suggesting that although prosecuting pirates may require states to also
consider additional asylum claims, the risk that states will have to grant such claims is small and
also a burden they should assume so that pirates may be brought to justice.
  
 
236 
PIRATES AND IMPUNITY: IS THE THREAT OF 
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  INTRODUCTION  
Pirates are literally getting away with murder. Modern 
pirates are attacking vessels, hijacking ships at gunpoint, taking 
hostages, and injuring and killing crew members.1 They are 
doing so with increasing frequency. According to the 
International Maritime Bureau (“IMB”) Piracy Reporting 
Center’s 2009 Annual Report, there were 406 pirate attacks in 
20092—a number that has not been reached since 2003.3 Yet, in 
most instances, a culture of impunity reigns whereby nations are 
not holding pirates accountable for the violent crimes they 
commit.4 
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1. See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BUREAU, 
PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS, ANNUAL REPORT 5–6, 12, 25 (2010) 
[hereinafter ICC-IMB]. 
2. Id. at 2. For purposes of gathering its statistics, the International Maritime 
Bureau (“IMB”) reports acts of piracy and armed robbery that it defines as follows: “An 
act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the apparent intent to commit 
theft or any other crime and with the apparent intent or capability to use force in the 
furtherance of that act.” Id. at 3. It is important to note that the IMB tracks only those 
incidents that are reported. The true number of actual and attempted pirate attacks 
could be much higher, as it is generally believed that many ship owners do not report 
attacks for fear their ships will be delayed during an investigation or that their insurance 
premiums may rise. See JOHN S. BURNETT, DANGEROUS WATERS: MODERN PIRACY AND 
TERROR ON THE HIGH SEAS 181 (2003); PETER CHALK, THE MARITIME DIMENSION OF 
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: TERRORISM, PIRACY, AND CHALLENGES FOR THE UNITED 
STATES 7 (2008). 
3. ICC-IMB, supra note 1, at 5–6, 25. 
4. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL EXPERT GROUP ON PIRACY OFF THE SOMALI COAST, 
PIRACY OFF THE SOMALI COAST: FINAL REPORT 31 (2008) [hereinafter PIRACY OFF THE 
SOMALI COAST: FINAL REPORT]; Drew H. Pearson, Can the Somali Pirates Be Stopped?, 42 
SEA CLASSICS 14, 20 (2009); Fernando Peinado Alcaraz, Chasing Pirates is All Very Well—
But Who is Going to Lock Them Up?, EL PAIS, Aug. 17, 2009, at 4; Mike Corder, Nations Look 
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Only a small portion of those people committing piracy are 
actually captured and brought to trial, as opposed to captured 
and released.5 For example, in September 2008, a Danish warship 
captured ten Somali pirates, but then later released them on a 
Somali beach, even though the pirates were found with assault 
weapons and notes stating how they would split their piracy 
proceeds with warlords on land.6 Britain’s Royal Navy has been 
accused of releasing suspected pirates,7 as have Canadian naval 
forces.8 Only very recently, Russia released captured Somali 
pirates—after a high-seas shootout between Russian marines and 
pirates that had attacked a tanker carrying twenty-three crew and 
US$52 million worth of oil.9 In May 2010, the United States 
released ten captured pirates it had been holding for weeks after 
concluding that its search for a nation to prosecute them was 
 
to Kenya as Venue for Piracy Trials, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 17, 2009, available at 
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2009073898_apeu
prosecutingpirates.html; Mariama Diallo, Nations Prove More Willing to Combat Piracy than 
Prosecuting Pirate Suspects, VOICE OF AMERICA, June 9, 2010, available at 
http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/east/Nations-Prove-More-Willing-to-
Combat-Piracy-than-Prosecuting-Pirate-Suspects-95861284.html; Eric Ellen, Bringing 
Piracy to Account, JANE’S NAVY INT’L, Apr. 1997, at 29; John Knott, United Kingdom: 
Somalia, the Gulf of Aden, and Piracy: An Overview, and Recent Developments, MONDAQ, Apr. 
15, 2009, available at http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=72910; Henry 
Ridgwell, Alleged Somali Pirates Face Trial in Europe, VOICE OF AMERICA, June 9, 2010, 
available at http://www.voanews.com/english/news/europe/Alleged-Somali-Pirates-
Face-Trial-in-Europe-95985709.html; Craig Whitlock, Lack of Prosecution Poses Challenge 
for Foreign Navies Who Catch Somali Pirates, WASH. POST, May 24, 2010, at A8. 
5. See International Efforts to Combat Maritime Piracy: Hearing Before the H.R. Subcomm. 
on Int’l Org., Human Rights, and Oversight, 111th Cong. 4, 6 (2009) (statement of Rear 
Admiral William Baumgartner) (explaining that most pirates literally “get away” with 
their illegal conduct and that even when pirates are caught in the act and apprehended, 
they are more typically released and permitted to continue their illegal activities, rather 
than being brought to justice). 
6. See Paulo Prada & Alex Roth, On the Lawless Seas, It’s Not Easy Putting Somali 
Pirates in the Dock, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 2008, at A16; see also Jeffrey Gettleman, Pirates 
Outmaneuver Warships off Somalia, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2008, at A6 (reporting that both 
Danish and American navies had been releasing suspected pirates). 
7. See Jason Groves, Navy Gives Somali Pirates Food and Water . . . Then Lets Them Sail 
off Scot Free, DAILY MAIL (London), Jan. 28, 2010, available at 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1246300/Navy-gives-pirates-food-water--lets-
sail-scot-free.html. 
8. See Canadian Warship Helps Vessel Evade Pirates, CTV NEWS, May 22, 2009, 
http://www.ctv.ca/CTVNews/Canada/20090522/cdn_warship_090522. 
9. See Ellen Barry, Russia Frees Somali Pirates It Had Seized in Shootout, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 8, 2010, at A4. 
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futile.10 In fact, between March and April 2010, European Union 
(“EU”) naval forces captured 275 alleged pirates, but only forty 
face prosecution.11 
Furthermore, when pirates are tried, they are often tried by 
Kenya or other African nations, rather than by the capturing 
nation.12 Kenya has entered into agreements with Canada, China, 
Denmark, the European Union, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States to try the pirates these nations capture.13 Mauritius, 
Seychelles, and Tanzania have executed similar agreements to 
prosecute captured pirates.14 In an effort to aid prosecutions, 
Western states have pledged money—about US$10 million since 
May 200915—to alleviate the strain on the “poorly equipped and 
 
10. See Craig Whitlock, Navy Releases Accused Somali Pirates Held on Warship for Six 
Weeks, WASH. POST, May 29, 2010, at A10; see also Michael Scott Moore, How Do You 
Prosecute a Pirate?, MILLER-MCCUNE, Dec. 16, 2009, available at http://www.miller-
mccune.com/politics/how-do-you-prosecute-a-pirate-6181; Mayport-Based Destroyer Sinks 
Pirate Mothership, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Apr. 3, 2010, at B-5. 
11. See Diallo, supra note 4. 
12. See, e.g., U.S. Navy Hands over 17 Pirates to Kenya, REUTERS, June 10, 2009, 
available at http://af.reuters.com/article/djiboutiNews/idAFLA105255820090610. 
13. See, e.g., Derek Kilner, Kenya, US Agree to Deal on Piracy, NORTH DENVER NEWS, 
Jan. 27, 2009, available at http://northdenvernews.com/content/view/1719/2; 
Alphonce Shindu, AG Queried over Kenya’s Role on Piracy Cases, DAILY NATION (Nairobi), 
Mar. 30, 2010, available at http://www.nation.co.ke/News/AG%20queried%
20over%20Kenya%20role%20in%20piracy%20cases/-/1056/889516/-/l96m63/-/index.
html; Claire Wanja, Kenya-China to Sign MOU on Anti-Piracy, KENYA BROAD. CORP., Mar. 4, 
2009, available at http://www.kbc.co.ke/news.asp?nid=55949; see also Council Decision 
No. 2009/293/CFSP, 2009 O.J. L 79/47, at 47 (concerning the Exchange of Letters 
between the European Union and the Government of Kenya on the conditions and 
modalities for the transfer of persons suspected of having committed acts of piracy and 
detained by the European Union-led naval force (EUNAVFOR), and seized property in 
the possession of EUNAVFOR, from EUNAVFOR to Kenya and for their treatment after 
such transfer). 
14. See Jean Paul Arouff, Mauritius Says Ready to Try, Imprison Pirates, REUTERS, June 
12, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLDE65B021; Diallo, supra 
note 4 (stating that Seychelles recently began prosecuting pirates, setting up a special 
court to hear some thirty-one cases); Daniel Richey, Mauritius to Try Accused Somali 
Pirates, JURIST, June 13, 2010, http://jurist.org/paperchase/2010/06/mauritius-to-try-
accused-somali-pirates.php; see also Council Decision No. 2009/877/CFSP, 2009 O.J. L 
315/35, at 35 (discussing the signing and provisional application of the Exchange of 
Letters between the European Union and the Republic of Seychelles on the conditions 
and modalities for the transfer of suspected pirates and armed robbers from 
EUNAVFOR to the Republic of Seychelles and for their treatment after such transfer); 
Exchange of Letters between the European Union and the Republic of Seychelles, 2009 
O.J. L 315/37. 
15. EU Pledges More Support to Kenya for Piracy Trials, KENYA BROAD. CORP., July 28, 
2010, available at http://www.kbc.co.ke/news.asp?nid=65581 (noting that Australia, 
Canada, the European Union, France, Germany, and the United States pledged more 
  
2011] PIRATES AND ASYLUM 239 
corrupt criminal justice system” and to cover the cost of 
transporting witnesses, training police and prosecutors, and 
upgrading prisons and courts.16 In fact, in late June 2010, the 
United Nations Office on Drug and Crimes (“UNODC”) used 
funds from donor nations to help open a new high-security 
courtroom in Mombasa, Kenya to prosecute pirates.17 
But why are Western states refusing to prosecute pirates on 
their own soil even though they—more so than less-developed 
nations—have the money and institutional capabilities to bring 
pirates to justice in a swift and fair manner? After all, these states 
are providing Kenya and other African nations with funds and 
support to help them conduct piracy trials. They are spending 
billions to support the various naval patrols that are capturing 
pirates—but thereafter releasing them to continue their criminal 
activities.18 While several reasons have been advanced to explain 
why nations may not be regularly prosecuting pirates,19 one 
 
than US$10 million to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (“UNODC”) 
program, which gives aid to other states in East Africa for the prosecution of piracy 
cases). 
16. Tom Maliti, UN: Donors to Give US$9.3M on Somali Piracy Cases, ABC NEWS, June 
15, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=10916654. 
17. UN and Kenya Open Courtroom to Prosecute Pirates in Mombasa Port, WIRE UPDATE 
NEWS, June 26, 2010, available at http://wireupdate.com/wires/6943/un-and-kenya-
open-courtroom-to-prosecute-pirates-in-mombasa-port. 
18. See, e.g., Antonio Maria Costa, The War on Piracy Must Start on Land, INT’L 
HERALD TRIB., June 9, 2010, at 8 (explaining that one vessel patrolling off the coast of 
Somalia costs US$100,000 per day and there are more than forty vessels on patrol, 
suggesting an annual operational cost of about US$1.5 billion); David Gauvey Herbert, 
Piracy Is Down, and Moving Farther Out, BURN AFTER READING, Apr. 21, 2010, available at 
http://burnafterreading.nationaljournal.com/2010/04/piracy-is-down-and-why-thats-
b.php (noting that EU, NATO, and US naval forces cost just less than US$1.9 billion per 
year to support). 
19. See, e.g., James Kraska, Coalition Strategy and the Pirates of the Gulf of Aden and the 
Red Sea, 28 COMP. STRATEGY 197, 207 (2009) (emphasizing the logistical difficulties 
associated with prosecuting pirates because the cases involve suspects from one country, 
witnesses and victims from other countries, and vessels that are registered in or carrying 
cargo from other countries). The other reasons typically cited to explain why nations are 
not willing to prosecute pirates do not seem applicable to Western and other developed 
nations. For example, commentators cite to the lack of institutional capacity to handle 
the cost and difficulty of piracy claims that may involve victims and witnesses from 
various states. Id. But, while pirate trials are necessarily costly as they involve witnesses 
and evidence from various countries, these are costs and difficulties that developed 
nations should be able to handle—even though they may not have the political will to do 
so. But c.f. James Kraska & Brian Wilson, Combating Pirates of the Gulf of Aden: The Djibouti 
Code and the Somali Coast Guard, 52 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 516, 516 (2009) (noting 
that captured pirates cannot be turned over to local authorities in Somalia because the 
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reason often given to explain the reluctance of Western nations 
to try pirates on their own soil is the threat of asylum claims by 
convicted pirates.20 This reason has been advanced by academics 
and government representatives, among others.21 Roger 
Middleton, a researcher for Chatham House, the London-based 
think tank, explained it this way: “These countries don’t want to 
be bombarded by claims of asylum from the pirates, who would 
ask not to be deported to Somalia, a country at war.”22 In fact, in 
April 2008, the British Foreign Office warned the Royal Navy that 
detaining pirates at sea could be a violation of their human rights 
and could also lead to asylum claims by pirates seeking to 
relocate to Europe.23 A former Tory chairman stated that 
ministers in Parliament had indicated privately that the reason 
captured pirates were not being brought to Britain for trial 
(including the sixty-six suspected pirates captured by the Royal 
Navy in 2009—all of whom were thereafter released) was because 
of fears those pirates might seek asylum in the country.24 And at 
least some pirates have actually threatened to seek asylum in the 
West. Reports indicate that two of the pirates on trial for 
 
failed state generally has no responsible authorities); DIETER BERG ET AL., KNOWLEDGE 
SERIES: PIRACY—THREAT AT SEA: A RISK ANALYSIS 29 (2009) (suggesting that many 
nations close to the territory where acts of piracy are typically committed do not have 
the security, enforcement, and financial resources to catch and prosecute pirates). In 
addition, while the absence of national laws criminalizing piracy is also cited to explain 
the lack of prosecutions, piracy is subject to universal jurisdiction, and most nations are 
parties to the international treaties criminalizing piracy, which require them to 
implement national legislation. See infra Part I.B. Furthermore, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, and the United States have brought charges against several suspected 
pirates, indicating that at least some developed nations do have the institutional capacity 
and necessary laws to allow them to prosecute pirates—if they also have the political will. 
See infra note 81. 
20. See Jean Paul Arouff, Mauritian Leader Says Country Is Ready to Tackle Piracy, 
SUNDAY HERALD (Glasgow), June 13, 2010, at 35; see also, e.g., Mohammed Abbas, EU 
Anti-Piracy Force Urges More Prosecutions, DAILY STAR (Beirut), Apr. 1, 2010, available at 
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=10&categ_id=2&article_id=113367. 
21. For example, at a workshop of international law experts and judges sponsored 
by the Academic Council on the United Nations System, the American Society of 
International Law, and the One Earth Future Foundation, many commented that the 
threat of asylum concerns was a reason why Western states are not eager to prosecute 
pirates in their territories. See ELIZABETH ANDERSEN ET AL., SUPPRESSING MARITIME 
PIRACY: EXPLORING THE OPTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3, 6–8 (2009). 
22. See Alcaraz, supra note 4. 
23. See Africa Politics: Combating Piracy, VIEWSWIRE, Feb. 13, 2009, available at 2009 
WLNR 2884026. 
24. See Groves, supra note 7. 
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attacking a Dutch vessel have declared their intention to try to 
stay on as residents.25 
Nevertheless, although the threat of asylum claims is 
frequently offered to explain Western nations’ reluctance to 
prosecute pirates in their territories, what is not addressed is 
whether this fear has any actual basis in fact or law. Instead, the 
statement that nations are afraid of asylum claims is followed by 
little explanation at all—and certainly no legal analysis of the 
international or domestic laws on which convicted pirates would 
base their claims for asylum. In any event, even if the fear of 
asylum claims is well-founded, is this a reason to allow Western 
nations to avoid their duty to prosecute crimes that violate 
international law? Although some pirates are being prosecuted, 
why should others get away with murder solely because Western 
nations fear asylum claims? 
This Article is concerned with these issues and examines 
international refugee law and international human rights law in 
an effort to determine the likely viability of any asylum claims 
that may be brought by pirates convicted in the West. Based on 
an analysis of the text of the main international treaties 
governing asylum and non-refoulement, as well as interpretations of 
the provisions contained in those treaties, this Article concludes 
there is little reason to believe that Western states would be 
required to grant refugee status (as that term is defined in the 
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees) to convicted 
pirates. Among other things, pirates are not a group that is 
subject to persecution, and pirates have committed the types of 
serious and violent crimes that should exclude them from 
claiming refugee status—and thus, the residence and other 
benefits associated with being granted asylum. 
Second, states should be able to legally expel or deport 
convicted pirates under international human rights treaties since 
most pirates are likely unable to show they would face torture if 
expelled or returned to their country of origin. Even if pirates 
could show they risk torture or other inhumane treatment upon 
return, states may be able to satisfy their international obligations 
regarding non-refoulement and return pirates if the state receives 
 
25. See Bruno Waterfield, Somali Pirates Embrace Capture as Route to Europe, 
TELEGRAPH (London), May 19, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
piracy/5350183/Somali-pirates-embrace-capture-as-route-to-Europe.html. 
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diplomatic assurances that the authorities would not resort to 
such treatment. Furthermore, under the recent European 
Qualitative Directive, European Union Member States are not 
required to grant benefits such as residence permits to 
individuals who have committed serious and violent crimes, even 
though the European Convention on Human Rights prohibits 
refoulement to face torture or other ill treatment. 
Finally, even if there is some risk that some pirates can 
mount successful asylum or non-refoulement claims, the risk is one 
that developed Western states should assume because of the 
greater good that will come from ensuring that pirates are 
brought to justice (especially by way of fair trials and processes 
that respect human rights).26 Developed nations risk asylum 
claims (by pirates and others) simply because they are 
developed—a status that typically carries with it an expectation 
that the state will protect human rights and enforce the rule of 
law. In this instance, enforcing the rule of law means that nations 
must invoke universal jurisdiction or use the prohibitions 
contained in international treaties and in their own domestic 
laws to prosecute violent and dangerous pirates even if it means 
they must consider and adjudicate some additional asylum 
claims. Bringing to justice the pirates that commit violent acts 
and disrupt international waters is a goal as worthy as numerous 
others where nations accept the risk of asylum claims, and pirates 
are unlikely to be deterred from committing those acts unless 
nations commit to end the current culture of impunity. 
Part I of this Article describes the modern piracy problem, 
including the international law governing piracy, and the culture 
of impunity that surrounds it. Part II provides a brief overview of 
the international law providing protection for those seeking 
 
26. See Yvonne M. Dutton, Bringing Pirates to Justice: A Case for Including Piracy within 
the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 197, 201–02 (2010). 
Prosecuting pirates in national courts is necessary even if piracy is included within the 
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”). The ICC relies on a system of 
complementarity and expects that state parties will prosecute in their courts serious 
crimes of concern to the international community. Including piracy within the 
jurisdiction of the ICC will simply provide another avenue to prosecute captured pirates, 
particularly in those instances where only a failed state such as Somalia (without 
resources or judicial capacity) otherwise has the best case for jurisdiction over the 
offense. If piracy is not included within the ICC or some other international tribunal, it 
is even more important that developed nations accept the burdens associated with 
prosecuting captured pirates in their domestic courts. See id. at 235–36. 
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asylum, focusing on international refugee law as well as the 
primary treaties under international human rights law that 
govern the transfer of persons and specifically prohibit transfer 
to states where those persons would be subjected to torture or ill 
treatment. Parts III and IV analyze international refugee law and 
international human rights law in the context of potential claims 
by convicted pirates seeking asylum and protection against non-
refoulement. The Article concludes by suggesting that although 
prosecuting pirates may require states to also consider additional 
asylum claims, the risk that states will have to grant such claims is 
small and also a burden they should assume so that pirates may 
be brought to justice. 
I. THE PIRACY PROBLEM 
A. Modern Piracy: An Ever-Increasing Threat 
Although some might think piracy is the stuff of history and 
legend, piracy is actually a modern and ever-increasing threat to 
the international community. According to the IMB, between 
January 2005 and December 2009, there were 1477 pirate attacks 
worldwide.27 Furthermore, the number of reported pirate attacks 
in 2009 alone exceeded by at least twenty-five percent the total 
number of such attacks in each of the prior four years.28 These 
attacks were not without victims: in 2009, pirates boarded 
approximately 153 vessels, hijacked 49 ships, and took 1052 crew 
members hostage.29 Sixty-eight of those crew members were 
injured in those incidents, and eight were killed.30 Although the 
highest number of pirate attacks in 2009 occurred off the Gulf of 
Aden and the coast of Somalia, significant numbers of attacks 
also occurred in the waters off of Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Nigeria, and Peru.31 Victims of the attacks include flag 
states, ship owners, crew members, and cargo from all over the 
globe.32 
 
27. ICC-IMB, supra note 1, at 5–6. This amounts to almost one attack every day 
some place in the world. 
28. Id. at 5–6. 
29. Id. at 25. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. at 5–6. 
32. See Piracy on the High Seas: Protecting Our Ships, Crews and Passengers: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp. and Subcomm. on Surface Transp. and 
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The breadth and availability of equipment and technology 
has further increased the threat associated with piracy today. The 
use of guns in pirate attacks has more than tripled since 2007.33 
Somali pirates use automatic weapons and rocket propelled 
grenades to board and hijack vessels where they take crew 
hostage and demand ransom payments.34 Pirates attacking off the 
coast of Nigeria are reported to be armed with knives and 
automatic weapons, which they often use against crewmembers 
during attacks.35 In addition, pirates now operate from high-
speed maneuverable skiffs that are supported by “mother ships,” 
enabling them to launch attacks from a distance of up to 1000 
nautical miles.36 In many cases, they are armed with satellite 
phones and GPS systems that allow them to track ships to target 
for attack.37 
 
Merch. Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and Sec., 111th Cong. 2 (2009) (statement of Brian 
Salerno, Assistant Commandant for Marine Safety, Security, and Stewardship, US Coast 
Guard) [hereinafter Statement of Salerno] (“[A] single piratical attack affects the 
interests of numerous countries, including the flag State of the vessel, various States of 
nationality of the seafarers taken hostage, regional coastal States, owners’ States, and 
cargo shipment and transshipment States.”); ICC-IMB , supra note 1, at 5–6. 
33. See ICC-IMB, supra note 1, at 12. 
34. See id. at 22. 
35. See id. at 25, 40. 
36. See, e.g., id. at 23 (reporting that some attacks off the coast of Somalia had 
occurred at distances of approximately 1000 nautical miles from Mogadishu); PIRACY 
OFF THE SOMALI COAST: FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 18 (noting that pirate skiffs now 
operate with as many as two 150 horsepower outboard motors attached); ROGER 
MIDDLETON, PIRACY IN SOMALIA: THREATENING GLOBAL TRADE, FEEDING LOCAL WARS 4 
(2008) (noting that Somali pirates now use mother ships to increase the range from 
which they can launch attacks); Worldwide Hijackings Fall but Pirates Expand Area of 
Operation, DAILY NEWS (Colombo), May 6, 2010, http://www.dailynews.lk/2010/05/06/
bus60.asp (stating that pirate attacks had occurred some 1000 nautical miles off the 
Somali coast); see also Thean Potgieter, The Lack of Maritime Security in the Horn of Africa 
Region: Scope and Effect, 31 STRATEGIC REV. S. AFR. 65 (2009). In fact, on November 15, 
2008, Somali pirates captured the Sirius Star, a supertanker carrying more than two 
million barrels of oil destined for the United States, some 450 nautical miles southeast of 
Kenya. This capture alerted the world to pirates’ ability to extend their reach well 
beyond the coastlines by using mother ships from which faster, smaller skiffs loaded with 
outboard motors can be launched. Id. 
37. See PIRACY OFF THE SOMALI COAST: FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 17–18 
(noting that pirates are equipped with sophisticated technology that they obtain using 
their ransom profits); Piracy Hit All-Time High in 2009, Says Report, DAILY NATION 
(Nairobi), Jan. 14, 2010, http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-/1056/842406/-/vpb4gn/-/
index.html (explaining that pirates are equipped with automatic weapons, as well as 
high-tech communication gadgets like laptops, computers, satellite cell phones, and 
other military hardware). 
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Furthermore, although some pirates may be simple 
fisherman, recent reports indicate that attacks are being carried 
out by well-organized pirate gangs often headed by kingpins or 
backed by investors and corrupt officials lured by the hefty 
ransoms that pirates can now demand for the safe release of ships 
and their crews.38 Some authorities estimate that ransom 
payments made to pirates for the safe return of crew totaled 
more than US$100 million for the year 2009.39 Estimates further 
put the average ransom at between US$2 million and US$3 
million, with “mere gunmen” in Somalia earning up to 
US$15,000 for participating in an attack.40 
Some pirates have become so wealthy that they can hire 
others to carry out the attacks: they invest in weapons, boats, and 
communications equipment, but face little risk of arrest or 
 
38. See, e.g., ASSEMBLY OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION [AWEU], REPORT: THE 
ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN COMBATING PIRACY, at 6, WEU Doc. A/2037 (June 4, 
2009) (suggesting that piracy today is more like organized crime with many competing 
pirate gangs, and with profits shared according to fixed rules whereby thirty percent 
goes to investors, fifty percent to the attackers, and five percent to families of deceased 
or captured pirates); Kraska, supra note 19, at 199 (stating that organized crime kingpins 
who live in Puntland or Mombassa, Kenya are the recipients of most of the ransom 
monies collected by Somali pirates); Potgieter, supra note 36 (stating that modern 
pirates are often organized along military lines, and that one of the most prominent 
groups is the Somali Marines, an organization with between seventy-five and 100 
members); Scott Baldauf, Pirates, Inc.: Inside the Booming Somali Business, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, May 31, 2009, at 6 (reporting that modern pirates are backed by a network of 
investors and corrupt officials who purchase equipment for them, assist in choosing 
targets based on the Lloyd’s of London list of insured ships, and thereafter pay 
themselves by underground money transfers); Michael G. Frodl, Somali Piracy Tactics 
Evolve; Threats Could Expand Globally, NAT’L DEF. MAG., Apr. 10, 2010, 
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2010/April/Pages/SomaliPiracy
TacticsEvolve.aspx (reporting that pirates are funded not just by ransoms and local 
investor money, but also by the flow of capital from foreign criminal gangs). 
39. See, e.g., Costa, supra note 18, at 8. For examples relating to individual ransom 
payments, see REPORT: THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN COMBATING PIRACY, supra 
note 38, at 4 (pirates received US$3.2 million for the release of the Ukrainian ship Faina 
after five months and received US$3 million for the release of the Sirius Star after two 
months); Mohamed Ahmed & Abdi Guled, Ransom Paid for Oil Tanker, Somalia Pirates 
Feud, REUTERS, Jan. 17, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/
idUSTRE60G1J420100117 (pirates received ransom of approximately US$5.5 million in 
January 2010 for the release of a Greek-flagged tanker); Tsvetelia Tsolova, Somali Pirates 
Free UK-Flagged Ship after Ransom, REUTERS, June 11, 2010, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE65A59V20100611 (in June 2010, US$5.8 
million was paid to pirates for the release of a UK-flagged ship). 
40. See Baldauf, supra note 38; see also PIRACY OFF THE SOMALI COAST: FINAL 
REPORT, supra note 4, at 17 (stating that an armed pirate can earn between US$6000 
and US$10,000 for a single hijacking yielding a ransom of about US$1 million). 
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prosecution because they never board ships.41 In fact, one report 
indicates that pirates in Somalia have organized an exchange 
market where local financiers can find pirate gangs to 
underwrite.42 One wealthy former pirate told the reporter that 
the exchange now hosted some seventy-two “maritime 
companies,” ten of which had mounted successful hijackings in 
only a four-month period.43 
B. The International Law Governing Maritime Piracy 
Pirates need not go unpunished for their criminal conduct 
inasmuch as international law provides many legal tools for 
prosecuting pirates. Under customary international law, piracy is 
the oldest crime to which universal jurisdiction44 applies.45 For 
 
41. See, e.g., REPORT: THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN COMBATING PIRACY, 
supra note 38, at 9; Uma Shankari, Follow the Money Trail to Reduce Piracy: Official Pirate 
Backers, Such as Organised Crime Groups, Get Bulk of Ransom Money, SHIPPING TIMES 
(Singapore), Oct. 15, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 20297638 (suggesting that piracy is a 
form of organized crime and that the backers of the piracy are organized crime groups 
who get the bulk of the ransom money). 
42. See Mohamed Ahmed, Pirate Stock Exchange Helps Fund Hijackings, FIN. POST 
(Ontario), Nov. 30, 2009, http://www.financialpost.com/news-sectors/
story.html?id=2289558 (outlining the pirate stock market in Somalia and explaining how 
an increase in shareholders increases the money available to fund pirates’ operations, 
which subsequently increases the ransom monies gained); see also Michael Scott Moore, 
The Pirate Stock Market, MILLER-MCCUNE, Dec. 9, 2009, http://www.miller-mccune.com/
politics/the-pirate-stock-market-5935. 
43. See Ahmed, supra note 42. 
44. In 2000, a group of scholars and jurists met at Princeton University to examine 
the doctrine of universal jurisdiction. In the document resulting from that meeting, The 
Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction, universal jurisdiction was defined as “criminal 
jurisdiction based solely on the nature of the crime, without regard to where the crime 
was committed, the nationality of the alleged or convicted perpetrator, the nationality of 
the victim, or any other connection to the state exercising such jurisdiction.” PRINCETON 
PROJECT ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL 
JURISDICTION 28 (2001). 
45. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 161 (1820) (“The 
common law, too, recognises and punishes piracy as an offence, not against its own 
municipal code, but as an offence against the law of nations (which is part of the 
common law) as an offence against the universal law of society, a pirate being deemed 
an enemy of the human race.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF 
THE UNITED STATES §§ 404, 423 (1987) (stating that piracy is one of the offenses that the 
United States and other states may define and adjudicate according to the universality 
principle); 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 72 (9th ed. 1783) (stating that 
piracy is a violation of the law of nations and that “every community” has a right to 
punish pirates); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: 
Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 81, 110–11 (2001) 
(“[U]niversal jurisdiction to prevent and suppress piracy has been widely recognized in 
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centuries, nations have deemed pirates to be hostis humani generis 
(enemies of all mankind), such that any nation may use its own 
domestic laws to try and to punish those committing piracy, 
regardless of the pirates’ nationalities or where the piratical acts 
took place.46 It is the general heinousness of piratical acts and the 
fact that they are directed against ships and persons of many 
nationalities that warrants universal jurisdiction.47 In addition to 
universal jurisdiction, two international treaties provide the 
jurisdictional bases for nations to prosecute piracy domestically. 
The first is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(“UNCLOS”), which specifically defines the crime of piracy.48 
The second is the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (“SUA 
Convention”).49 Drafted in response to the Achille Lauro incident 
when Palestinian terrorists hijacked an Italian cruise liner, the 
SUA Convention covers ship hijackings.50 Some 161 states are 
parties to UNCLOS,51 and 156 are parties to the SUA 
Convention.52 
 
customary international law as the international crime par excellence to which universality 
applies.”); Edwin D. Dickinson, Is the Crime of Piracy Obsolete?, 38 HARV. L. REV. 334, 335–
39 (1925) (suggesting pirates as enemies of all mankind were subject to universal 
jurisdiction since the early seventeenth century). 
46. See 3 EDWARDO COKE, INSTITUTES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 113 (1797); 
Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction under International Law, 66 TEX. L. REV. 785, 
791 (1988). 
47. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over 
International Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act after Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 53, 60 (1981) (explaining that piracy was subject to universal 
jurisdiction because of its heinousness); Randall, supra note 46, at 793–94 (suggesting 
that the most accurate rationale for providing universal jurisdiction over piracy relies on 
the wicked and heinous nature of piracy offenses which involve violence and 
depredation and the fact that piracy is directed against ships of all nations); see also 
Statement of Salerno, supra note 32 (“Maritime piracy is a universal crime under 
international law because it places the lives of seafarers in jeopardy and affects the 
shared economic interests of all nations.”). 
48. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, arts. 100–08, 110, Dec. 10, 
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
49. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221, 27 I.L.M. 668 [hereinafter SUA 
Convention]. 
50. See, e.g., REPORT: THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN COMBATING PIRACY, 
supra note 38, at 12; Malvina Halberstam, Terrorism on the High Seas: The Achille Lauro, 
Piracy and the IMO Convention on Maritime Safety, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 269, 270–72 (1988). 
51. For a list of state ratifications, see U.N. Div. for Ocean Affairs & the Law of the 
Sea, Chronological List of Ratifications to the Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm 
  
248 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 34:236 
Article 105 of UNCLOS codifies piracy’s status as a crime 
subject to universal jurisdiction and provides that any state may 
seize pirate ships and arrest and prosecute pirates.53 In addition, 
under Article 100, states are actually required to cooperate in the 
repression of piracy to the fullest possible extent,54 a mandate 
that suggests that states should make some efforts to assist in the 
arrest and prosecution of pirates. Regarding the acts over which 
states would have jurisdiction, UNCLOS defines piracy as: 
any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of 
depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the 
passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and 
directed: 
on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against 
persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; 
against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place 
outside the jurisdiction of any State; 
any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship 
or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate 
ship or aircraft; 
any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act 
described in subparagraph (a) or (b).55 
Under Article 103, a ship is a pirate ship “if it is intended by the 
persons in dominant control to be used for the purpose of 
committing one of the acts referred to Article 101.”56  
   In sum, UNCLOS provides a definition of the crime of piracy 
that is broad enough to cover many acts of modern piracy.57 In 
 
(last updated Nov. 15, 2010). Notably, although the United States is not a party to 
UNCLOS, it did ratify an earlier version of the treaty with identical provisions regarding 
piracy. See Geneva Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 
U.N.T.S. 82. 
52. See Status of Conventions, INT’L MAR. ORG., http://www.imo.org/About/
Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Pages/Default.aspx (last visited Dec. 1, 2010). 
53. UNCLOS, supra note 48, art. 105. 
54. Id. art. 100 (“All states shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the 
repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any 
State.”). 
55. Id. art. 101. 
56. Id. art. 103. 
57. Although UNCLOS does contain a broad definition of the crime of piracy, 
commentators have noted that it may not be able to cover all acts that are presently 
understood or reported as pirate attacks. For example, under Article 101 of UNCLOS, 
the definition of piracy includes only those acts that occur on the high seas or outside 
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addition, the vast majority of nations are party to UNCLOS, and 
it even contains a provision that, at least in theory, requires 
nations to prosecute piratical acts.58 
Under the SUA Convention, a prohibited offense is 
committed by anyone who (1) “seizes or exercises control over a 
ship by force or threat thereof or any other form of 
intimidation,”59 (2) “performs an act of violence against a person 
on board a ship if that act is likely to endanger the safe 
navigation of the ship,”60 or (3) attempts to do any of the above.61 
In contrast to UNCLOS, this convention applies to offenses 
committed even in territorial or archipelagic waters or in port, as 
long as the ship is scheduled for international navigation.62 In 
terms of jurisdiction, any signatory state may prosecute violations 
of the SUA Convention provided that the offense (1) was against 
a ship flying its flag, (2) occurred in its territory, (3) was 
committed by a national of the state, or (4) had a national of the 
state as a victim.63 Furthermore, the convention requires the 
signatory state in whose territory an offender is found to either 
extradite or prosecute.64 Accordingly, the SUA Convention, 
unlike UNCLOS, does appear to cover pirate attacks that occur 
while ships are in territorial waters.65 And although only signatory 
states with a nexus to the offense are entitled to prosecute,66 156 
states are party to the convention. Furthermore, as noted above, 
there are four different ways in which signatories may assert the 
 
the territory of any state. Thus, where acts of piracy occur in territorial waters and ports, 
UNCLOS is not applicable. In such cases, only the nation in whose territory the acts 
occurred has jurisdiction to prosecute using UNCLOS. Other nations would have to use 
other legal tools, such as universal jurisdiction or the SUA Convention, discussed below, 
in order to prosecute acts of piracy that occurred in the territorial waters of another 
state. See id. art. 101. 
58. Id. art. 100. 
59. SUA Convention, supra note 49, art. 3(1)(a). 
60. Id. art. 3(1)(b). 
61. Id. art. 3(2)(a). 
62. Id. art. 4. 
63. Id. art. 6. 
64. Id. arts. 7, 10. 
65. Id. art. 3. However, the SUA Convention also may not cover attacks occurring 
solely while a ship is docked at shore given the treaty’s requirement that the attack “is 
likely to endanger the safe navigation of the ship.” Id. art. 3(1)(b). 
66. See id. art. 6. 
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necessary nexus to the offense allowing them to prosecute 
offenders on their soil.67 
C. The Culture of Impunity: Nations’ Reluctance to Prosecute Pirates 
The international community has demonstrated its concern 
over the severity of the problems associated with modern piracy 
in a number of ways. Naval patrols incorporating a host of 
different nations have formed and now roam pirate-infested 
waters in an effort to disrupt pirate attacks.68 The United Nations 
Security Council has also taken unprecedented steps in an effort 
to repress piracy occurring off the coast of Somalia. By a series of 
resolutions adopted during 2008, the Security Council not only 
authorized coalition navies to enter the territorial waters of 
Somalia and use “all necessary means to repress acts of piracy 
and armed robbery,” but also authorized states to use land-based 
operations in Somalia to fight piracy.69 Indeed, by Resolution 
1851, for a period of one year, “[s]tates and regional 
organizations cooperating in the fight against piracy and armed 
robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia” were permitted to take 
“all necessary measures that are appropriate in Somalia . . . to 
bring to justice those who are using Somali territory to plan, 
facilitate or undertake acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea.”70 
That resolution received unanimous support from member 
 
67. See id. 
68. See, e.g., REPORT: THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN COMBATING PIRACY, 
supra note 38, at 8–9 (noting that in November 2007, countries, including Canada, 
Denmark, France, and the Netherlands, began providing naval escorts for World Food 
Program ships and that various multinational naval operations have cooperated to 
conduct counter-piracy operations thereafter); U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the 
Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1846 (2008), ¶ 30, U.N. Doc. 
S/2009/146 (Mar. 16, 2009) (noting that beginning in late 2008, a multinational naval 
force comprised of some fifteen states (CTF-150) started conducting counter-piracy 
operations around the Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean). The 
European Union has also launched its own counter-piracy operation off the coast of 
Somalia using frigates and naval patrol aircraft. See REPORT: THE ROLE OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION IN COMBATING PIRACY, supra note 38, at 9. In addition, China, India, 
and Russia have coordinated their actions with other forces. See id. 
69. See S.C. Res. 1816, ¶ 7(b), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1816 (June 2, 2008); S.C. Res. 
1851, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1851 (Dec. 16, 2008). 
70. S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 69, ¶¶ 6–7. 
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states, who stressed the many negative consequences resulting 
from the acts of piracy off of Somalia’s coast.71 
In addition, international and regional groups have been 
formed to address the problem of piracy and to study ways to 
repress it. The United States, for instance, created an 
International Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia 
(“Contact Group”).72 As of June 2010, some fifty nations were 
members of the Contact Group, which has working groups to 
focus on a variety of counter-piracy efforts.73 Nations in the areas 
closest to important shipping lanes have also been coordinating 
separately to address the problem of piracy. In January 2009, 
seventeen states from the areas surrounding the Western Indian 
Ocean, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea met in Djibouti and 
adopted a Code of Conduct concerning the repression of piracy 
(“Djibouti Code”).74 The Djibouti Code covers, among other 
things, the possibilities of shared naval and air patrols, as well as 
the use of piracy information exchange centers in Kenya, 
Tanzania, and Yemen.75 Saudi Arabia recently signed the Djibouti 
Code, becoming the thirteenth state to sign the code of 
conduct.76 
However, despite all this cooperation and the monies spent 
on patrols (which some estimates suggest total well over US$1 
 
71. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Authorizes States to Use Land-
Based Operations in Somalia, as Part of Fight against Piracy off Coast, Unanimously 
Adopting 1851, U.N. Press Release SC/9541 (Dec. 16, 2008). 
72. See Statement of Salerno, supra note 32, at 7. 
73. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of 
Somalia Marks First Anniversary (Jan. 26, 2010), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/
prs/ps/2010/01/135862.htm. The working groups are (1) military coordination and 
information sharing, (2) judicial aspects of piracy, (3) shipping self-awareness, and (4) 
improvement of diplomatic and public information aspects of piracy. Id. 
74. See, e.g., High-Level Meeting in Djibouti Adopts a Code of Conduct to Repress Acts of 
Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, INT’L MAR. ORG., Jan. 30, 2009, available at 
http://www.imo.org/About/mainframe.asp?topic_id=10933; IMO Djibouti Meeting Agrees 
Antipiracy Measures, MARINE LOG, Jan. 30, 2009, available at www.marinelog.com/DOCS/
NEWSMMIX/2009jan00302.html; Nine Countries Sign Deal to Fight Somali Piracy, 
ALARABIYA.NET (Dubai), Jan. 29, 2009, available at http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/
2009/01/29/65299.html; International Maritime Organization [IMO], Protection of Vital 
Shipping Lanes: Sub-Regional Meeting to Conclude Agreements on Maritime Security, Piracy, and 
Armed Robbery against Ships for States from the Gulf of Aden, Red Sea Areas, and Western 
Indian Ocean, at 5, IMO Doc. C/102/14 (Apr. 3, 2009). 
75. See IMO, supra note 74, ¶ 10. 
76. See Saudi Arabia Signs Djibouti Anti-Piracy Code, MAR. EXEC., Mar. 11, 2010, 
available at http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/saudi-arabia-signs-djibouti-anti-
piracy-code. 
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billion annually),77 pirate attacks are on the rise.78 Pirates are not 
being deterred from their criminal activities, a fact which is 
unsurprising if one considers that the majority of pirates are not 
prosecuted even after being captured while committing acts of 
piracy.79 Although pirates could be prosecuted using universal 
jurisdiction or under UNCLOS or the SUA Convention,80 a 
culture of impunity reigns81 whereby the majority of captured 
pirates are returned to their skiffs or dropped on shore.82 States 
have apparently used universal jurisdiction as a basis for 
prosecuting acts of piracy only in very few instances.83 States have 
used UNCLOS and the SUA Convention provisions even more 
rarely.84 Many have not even implemented domestic legislation 
 
77. See Costa, supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
78. See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text. 
79. See supra notes 5–12 and accompanying text. 
80. Indeed, as noted above, both UNLCOS and the SUA Convention contain 
provisions which purport to obligate states to cooperate in bringing pirates to justice. See 
SUA Convention, supra note 49, arts. 7, 10; UNLCOS, supra note 48, art. 100. 
81. Some nations are prosecuting pirates, but the prosecutions are few when 
compared to the number of pirates (including those who finance and plan the attacks) 
who must have participated in several hundred attacks that have occurred in each of the 
last several years. For example, the Netherlands prosecuted five Somali pirates who 
attacked a Dutch Antilles-flagged ship. In June 2010, those five were found guilty of sea 
robbery. See Toby Sterling, Dutch Court Sentences 5 Somali Pirates to 5 Years, WASH. TIMES, 
June 17, 2010, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/jun/17/dutch-court-
sentences-5-somali-pirates-5-years. France is prosecuting several more piracy suspects. See 
Corder, supra note 4. The first pirate prosecuted by the United States in more than a 
century pled guilty in May 2010 to participating in hijacking the Maersk Alabama and 
holding its American captain hostage off the coast of Somalia during April 2009. See, e.g., 
Patricia Hurtado & David Glovin, Somali Man Pleads Guilty in U.S. to Hijacking Ship, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, May 19, 2010, available at http://www.businessweek.com/
news/2010-05-19/somali-man-pleads-guilty-in-u-s-to-hijacking-ship-off-africa.html; Ed 
Pilkington, Somali Faces First Trial in over a Century in the US for Piracy, GUARDIAN 
(London), Apr. 22, 2009, at 15. In July 2010, Seychelles sentenced eleven Somali pirates 
to ten years in prison for attempting to seize a coastguard boat in September. See Eleven 
Somali Pirates Jailed in Seychelles, RTT NEWS, July 26, 2010, http://www.rttnews.com/
Content/GeneralNews.aspx?Id=1370247&SM=1. 
82. See supra notes 5–12 and accompanying text. 
83. See Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s 
Hollow Foundation, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 183, 192 (2004) (citing ALFRED RUBIN, THE LAW 
OF PIRACY 302, 348 n.50 (2d ed. 1998)). 
84. See Eugene Kontorovich, “A Guantanamo on the Sea”: The Difficulties of Prosecuting 
Pirates and Terrorists, 98 CAL. L. REV. 243, 254 (2010) (stating that the SUA Convention 
has only been used once—in a case originally brought by the United States in the 
United States District Court in the District of Hawaii against a cook who commandeered 
a fishing trawler); Carlo Tiribelli, Time to Update the 1988 Rome Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 8 OR. REV. INT’L L. 
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incorporating treaty provisions relating to the repression of 
piracy—even though they agreed to do so by the treaty terms.85 
Absent a significant increase in criminal prosecutions, it is 
unlikely that pirates will be deterred from committing their 
violent—and lucrative—acts.86 Indeed, in April 2010, the 
international community and the Security Council noted that the 
failure of nations to accept their duty to prosecute and imprison 
pirates was undermining the international community’s anti-
piracy efforts.87 To address this failure, the Security Council 
adopted a unanimous resolution calling on all states to 
criminalize piracy under their national laws and to consider 
favorably the prosecution of piracy suspects and imprisonment of 
convicted pirates.88 
Nations—particularly Western nations—should do just that: 
arrest, prosecute, and jail pirates. Western nations generally have 
the expertise, institutions, and funds required to prosecute 
pirates, and they should not be permitted to assert the fear of 
asylum claims as a reason for refusing to prosecute captured 
 
133, 136 (2006) (noting that UNCLOS apparently has only been used once in a case 
against Greenpeace). 
85. See, e.g., AWEU, supra note 38, at 13. 
86. Deterrence and the prevention of future criminal activity are primary goals of 
criminal prosecutions—including international criminal prosecutions. For example, the 
preamble to the Rome Statute creating the International Criminal Court emphasizes the 
potential deterrent effect of the court, noting that it is being created “to put an end to 
impunity for the perpetrators of [the covered crimes] and thus to contribute to the 
prevention of such crimes.” Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court pmbl., ¶ 
5, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Rome Statute]; see M. Cherif Bassiouni, 
Combating Impunity for International Crimes, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 409, 410 (2000) (“The 
pursuit of justice and accountability, it is believed, fulfills fundamental human values, 
helps achieve peace and reconciliation, and contributes to the prevention and 
deterrence of future conflicts.”); c.f. Michael P. Scharf, Conceptualizing Violence: Present 
and Future Developments in International Law: Panel II: Adjudicating Violence: Problems 
Confronting International Law and Policy on War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity: The 
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic: An Appraisal of the First International War Crimes Tribunal Since 
Nuremberg, 60 ALB. L. REV. 861, 869 (1997) (“If people in leadership positions know 
there’s an international court out there, that there’s an international prosecutor, and 
that the international community is going to act as an international police force, I just 
cannot believe that they aren’t going to think twice as to the consequences. Until now, 
they haven’t had to. There’s been no enforcement mechanism at all.” (quoting Richard 
Goldstone)). 
87. See S.C. Res. 1918, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1918 (Apr. 27, 2010); see also Press 
Release, Security Council, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1918 (2010), Calls on All 
States to Criminalize Piracy Under National Laws, U.N. Press Release SC/9913 (Apr. 27, 
2010). 
88. See supra note 87. 
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pirates on their own soil. Even if there is some risk of asylum 
claims, that risk is outweighed by the duty to ensure that violent 
criminals are brought to justice and that future violent acts are 
deterred. Furthermore, that risk is one that must be assumed if 
states are to live up to their obligations under international law.89 
II. OVERVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW PROVIDING 
PROTECTION FOR ASYLUM SEEKERS 
Under international law, states are under no obligation to 
grant asylum90 to those seeking it.91 However, where basic human 
rights would be threatened by returning an individual to his 
country of origin, a need for international protection may arise.92 
Thus, the right to deny admission to asylum seekers is limited by 
the principle of non-refoulement—a principle that finds expression 
primarily in refugee law, but also in international human rights 
law.93 Under that principle, states have a responsibility to protect 
individuals from being removed, returned, or transferred to a 
country where they are at risk of being persecuted or tortured.94 
The non-refoulement provisions of particular relevance to the 
problem of prosecuting pirates are contained in (1) the 1951 
Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Refugee 
 
89. See generally M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, AUT DEDERE AUT JUDICARE: THE DUTY TO 
EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1995) (discussing state duties to 
prosecute international crimes and the legal foundations for such duties under 
international law). 
90. The term “asylum” has no agreed-upon definition in international law. 
However, it generally refers to the protection of an individual by a state other than the 
individual’s state of origin or habitual residence from human rights violations or other 
similar proscribed harms. See CORNELIUS WOLFRAM WOUTERS, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
STANDARDS FOR THE PROTECTION FROM REFOULEMENT 23 (2009). 
91. See WALTER KALIN & JORG KUNZLI, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
PROTECTION 510 (2009) (noting that Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights provides only that individuals have the right “to seek and enjoy in other countries 
asylum from persecution,” with no corresponding obligation on the part of states to 
grant that asylum request); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) 
A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III), art. 14 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
92. See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], Providing 
International Protection Including through Complementary Forms of Protection, UNHCR Doc. 
EC/55/SC/CRP.16 (June 2, 2005). 
93. Aoife Duffy, Expulsion to Face Torture? Non-Refoulement in International Law, 20 
INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 373, 373–83 (2008); Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, There’s No Place Like 
Home: States’ Obligation in Relation to Transfers of Persons, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 703, 
704 (2008). 
94. WOUTERS, supra note 90, at 24. 
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Convention”) and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees (“1967 Protocol”);95 (2) the Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (“CAT”);96 (3) the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (“ICCPR”);97 and (4) the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (“ECHR”).98 
 
95. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 
6223, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention]. The Refugee Convention 
covers only those persons who have acquired the status of refugees as a result of acts 
occurring before January 1, 1951. The Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees is a 
treaty that incorporates Articles 2 through 34 of the Refugee Convention and covers 
those who have attained the status of refugees based on acts occurring after January 1, 
1951. See The Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 
6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol]. For a list of states party to the 
Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol, see UNHCR, States Parties to the 1951 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol (Oct. 1, 2008), 
http://www.unhcr.org/3b73b0d63.pdf. 
96. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT]. For a list 
of states party to CAT, see United Nations Treaty Collection (Feb. 12, 2010), 
http://treaties.un.org/ Pages/ ViewDetails.aspx?src= TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-9& chapter
= 4&lang=en. 
97. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty 
Doc. No. 95-20 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. For a list of states party to 
the ICCPR, see United Nations Treaty Collection (Feb. 12, 2010), 
http://treaties.un.org/ Pages/ ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter =
4&lang=en.  
98. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR] (as amended by Protocol No. 11 and 
including Protocols 1, 4, 6, 7, 12, 13, and 14). For a complete full text list of the ECHR, 
and all Protocols, see COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Complete List of the Council of Europe’s Treaties, 
http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeTraites.asp?CM=8&CL=ENG 
(last visited Dec. 1, 2010). For a list of states party to the ECHR, see COUNCIL OF 
EUROPE, http://conventions.coe.int/ Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=005&CM=
8&DF=&CL=ENG (last visited Dec. 1, 2010). There are other regional treaties that also 
address states’ non-refoulement obligations. See, e.g., Convention Governing Specific 
Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, June 20, 1974, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45 [hereinafter 
OAU Convention]; American Convention on Human Rights, July 18, 1978, 1144 
U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter ACHR]; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Basic Documents Pertaining to 
Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Serv.L.V/II.82, doc.6 rev.1 at 25 
(1992); African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, 21 
I.L.M. 58. Consideration of these regional treaties, however, is beyond the scope of this 
Article because it is focused on the obligations of Europe and other Western nations to 
prosecute pirates notwithstanding potential asylum claims. 
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A. Non-Refoulement in the Refugee Context 
The principle against refoulement was developed in relation 
to the protection of refugees and is specifically addressed in the 
Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol. The purpose of the 
convention is the international protection of fundamental 
human rights of individuals who are not protected by their own 
country.99 According to Article 33(1), “No Contracting State shall 
expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to 
the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”100 
The protections against refoulement and the other benefits 
associated with the Refugee Convention101 apply only to one who 
satisfies the definition of “refugee” contained in Article 1(A)(2), 
namely, a person who “owing to a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership 
of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the 
country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.”102 
Even where an individual meets the definition in Article 
1(A)(2), however, he or she may still be excluded from the 
definition of “refugee” for certain other reasons. Specifically, 
Article 1(F) forbids states from granting refugee status103 to: 
any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons 
for considering that: 
 
99. See WOUTERS, supra note 90, at 35. 
100. Refugee Convention, supra note 95, art. 33(1). 
101. See infra Part. II.A (discussing the benefits associated with being a “refugee” 
within the meaning of the Refugee Convention are not limited to a prohibition against 
refoulement). 
102. Refugee Convention, supra note 95, art. 1(A)(2). 
103. See James C. Hathaway & Colin J. Harvey, Framing Refugee Protection in the New 
World Disorder, 34 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 257, 263 (2001). According to Professors Hathaway 
and Harvey, Article 1(F) was designed to give legal force to Article 14(2) of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that the right to asylum “may not 
be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or 
from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.” Id. (quoting 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 91). They further suggest that 
Article 1(F) is crafted as a mandatory mechanism of exclusion to reflect the 
fundamental conviction that certain persons, because of the acts they have committed, 
are not deserving of international protection. Id. 
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He has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a 
crime against humanity, as defined in the international 
instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such 
crimes; 
He has committed a serious non-political crime outside the 
country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a 
refugee; 
He has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations.104 
Individuals who have committed the criminal acts referenced in 
Article 1(F) are excluded from the definition of “refugee” under 
the Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol, which means 
that they are not protected under refugee law from non-
refoulement and may be returned to their country of origin 
(although, as noted below, they may be afforded some protection 
against refoulement under international human rights law).105 
Those who are accorded the status of refugee may also be 
refused the convention’s protection against refoulement under 
Article 33(2) because they pose a fundamental threat to the 
country in which they are seeking refuge. The benefit of the non-
refoulement provision may not “be claimed by a refugee whom 
there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the 
security of the country in which he is, or who, having been 
convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, 
constitutes a danger to the community of that country.”106 
Therefore, even those who meet the “refugee” definition may 
still be denied the protections against refoulement where there are 
reasonable grounds to conclude they constitute a future danger 
to the security of the country in which they are seeking refuge or 
where their conviction of violent or other serious crimes causes 
them to be a future danger to the community.107 
Determinations of refugee status under the Refugee 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol are left to the state in whose 
 
104. Refugee Convention, supra note 95, art. 1(F). 
105. See infra Part II.B. 
106. Refugee Convention, supra note 95, art. 33(2). 
107. See Elihu Lauterpacht & Daniel Bethlehem, The Scope and Content of the 
Principle of Non-Refoulement, in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
UNHCR’S GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 134–35 (Erika 
Feller et al. eds., 2003). 
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territory the refugee applies for refugee status.108 However, state 
parties to the Refugee Convention are required to cooperate with 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(“UNHCR”) in the implementation and enforcement of the 
convention.109 The UNHCR may provide advice and guidelines 
on the proper interpretation of the convention’s terms.110 In 
addition, in 1958, the United Nations Economic and Social 
Council created the Executive Committee (“ExComm”) to advise 
the UNHCR in the exercise of its statutory functions.111 The 
ExComm adopts Conclusions on International Protection 
advising states and the UNHCR on the proper interpretation and 
application of the Refugee Convention.112 Nevertheless, while 
both the UNHCR and the ExComm may issue advice and 
guidance, neither has any specific enforcement power to obligate 
states to adopt its views.113 Accordingly, states may vary somewhat 
in the criteria they apply in determining whether an individual is 
entitled to refugee status and asylum (and the benefits, such as 
residency that are associated with that status) or protection from 
refoulement. 
In the event the state does determine the individual meets 
the “refugee” definition and is not otherwise excludable under 
Article 33(2), the Refugee Convention entitles the individual to 
certain benefits in addition to protection against refoulement. For 
example, refugees have the right to access courts of the state 
(Article 16); to seek wage-earning employment, subject to certain 
limitations (Articles 17–19); to receive elementary education 
 
108. See GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL & JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 53–54 (3d ed. 2007). 
109. See Refugee Convention, supra note 95, pmbl., arts. 35–36. 
110. See WOUTERS, supra note 90, at 40–41; see also UNHCR Handbook on 
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention 
and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1 (Jan. 
1992) [hereinafter UNHCR Refugee Handbook]. 
111. See WOUTERS, supra note 90, at 44. 
112. Id. at 45. The Executive Committee (“ExComm”) is comprised of a number of 
states that are members of the United Nations. 
113. Id. at 40, 45–46. For example, the UNHCR Refugee Handbook is referred to 
in refugee status proceedings throughout the world, though courts also often note that 
it is not binding. See GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 108, at 54 n.17; see also 
Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 427–28 (1999). 
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has stated that although the UNHCR Refugee 
Handbook “may be a useful interpretive aid . . . it is not binding on the Attorney 
General, the BIA, or the United States courts.” Id. 
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(Article 22(1)); to obtain certain housing and social welfare 
rights (Articles 20–21, 23–24); and to obtain travel documents, 
subject to certain limitations (Article 28). Because these rights 
are guaranteed by virtue of satisfying the definition of “refugee” 
under the Refugee Convention, persons meeting the definition 
also benefit from the ability to have the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees intervene on their behalf to insist 
that those rights are observed by state parties.114 
B. Non-Refoulement in the Human Rights Context 
Those not granted refugee status nor protected against 
refoulement under international refugee law may still benefit from 
the principle under the “complementary protection” granted by 
states under international human rights law.115 The treaties 
prohibiting refoulement most relevant to the potential asylum 
claims that could be brought by pirates convicted in Western 
nations are CAT, the ECHR, and the ICCPR.116 Each prohibits—
or has been interpreted to prohibit—returning persons to 
countries where they would face torture, or in some cases, where 
they would face cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
punishment.117 Unlike the Refugee Convention, which allows for 
certain exclusions and exceptions to the prohibition against 
refoulement, the provisions in each of these three human rights 
treaties is worded in terms that have caused some to conclude 
 
114. See Refugee Convention, supra note 95, art. 35; KALIN & KUNZLI, supra note 91, 
at 513. 
115. See Jane McAdam, Complementary Protection and Beyond: How States Deal with 
Human Rights Protection 1 (UNHCR: Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit, Working Paper 
No. 118, 2005). “Complementary protection” describes the protection granted by states 
to individuals on the basis of an international need outside the Refugee Convention 
framework. That protection may be available under a human rights treaty or under 
more general humanitarian principles, such as where protection is given to those fleeing 
war and violence. See id.; see also Gillard, supra note 93, at 727 (noting that even those 
who fail to receive protection under refugee law may be entitled to “complementary 
protection” under international human rights law, or under international humanitarian 
law, if he or she is in a state experiencing armed conflict). The present Article is limited 
to discussing the claims that captured pirates might assert under international treaties, 
and accordingly, an analysis of any potential humanitarian claims is beyond its scope. 
116. See CAT, supra note 96, art. 3(1); ICCPR, supra note 97, art. 7; ECHR, supra 
note 98, art. 3. 
117. See, e.g., ECHR, supra note 98, art. 3. 
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that they allow no exceptions or derogation.118 Nevertheless, as 
described in more detail below, each of the treaties provides 
somewhat varying levels of protection to applicants—for 
example, in terms of the type of future potential conduct against 
which the applicant may be protected and the level of risk the 
applicant must show in order to receive protection. Moreover, 
whether the applicant is protected against refoulement under these 
treaties depends not only on whether the country to which the 
applicant is applying for protection is a party to the treaty, but 
also how the particular country has interpreted treaty provisions 
or defined them in its own domestic law.119 Finally, even if the 
individual is protected against refoulement pursuant to these 
treaties, neither the treaties themselves—nor the bodies that 
interpret them—require that the individual be accorded any 
particular residence or other status in the receiving state. 
C. The CAT Non-Refoulement Provision 
The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
and Degrading Treatment or Punishment was adopted by the 
United Nations General Assembly in December 1984120 and 
entered into force in 1987. Article 3 of the treaty prohibits 
returning an individual to a country where “there are substantial 
grounds for believing he would be in danger of being subjected 
to torture.”121 As the language suggests, refoulement is only 
 
118. See Gillard, supra note 93, at 729; see also CAT, supra note 96, art. 2(2) (“No 
exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal 
political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of 
torture.”); Saadi v. Italy, App. No. 37201/06, ¶ 127 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 28, 2009), 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/47c6882e2.html (stating that the prohibition 
against torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment contained in 
the ECHR is absolute in nature such that states could not deport individuals who faced 
such threats even where those individuals were accused of serious crimes and could 
constitute a threat to national security if not deported). 
119. Some scholars have suggested that the principle of non-refoulement has become 
part of established customary international law such that states must comply with the 
principle even if they are not parties to CAT, the ECHR, the ICCPR, or the Refugee 
Convention. See, e.g., Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Non-refoulement and the New Asylum Seekers, 
reprinted in INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW: A READER 130 (B.S. Chimni ed., 2000); 
Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, supra note 107, at 140–64. However, other scholars disagree. 
See, e.g., J.C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 363 
(2005). This Article takes no position on the issue. 
120. G.A. Res. 39/46, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 (Dec. 10, 1984). 
121. CAT, supra note 96, art. 3. 
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proscribed where there is a risk of torture. An individual’s 
potential exposure to other forms of cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment or punishment does not give rise to a non-
refoulement obligation under CAT.122 
CAT specifically defines torture as: 
(a)ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical 
or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such 
purposes as obtaining from him or a third person 
information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or 
a third person has committed or is suspected of having 
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third 
person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any 
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the 
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public 
official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does 
not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in 
or incidental to lawful sanctions.123 
Notably, by the terms of the treaty, for a potential act to 
constitute “torture,” which creates a non-refoulement obligation, it 
must be inflicted by or with the acquiescence of a public official 
or other person acting in an official capacity. Persons in danger 
of being subjected to torture by private actors are not protected 
from refoulement under CAT, unless a government official 
consented or acquiesced to the abuse. According to the drafters, 
the requirement for state action or acquiescence reflects the 
expectation that any potential private violence or torture would 
be addressed via domestic law enforcement mechanisms, 
meaning that mechanisms for international protection would not 
be required.124 
Regarding the risk of torture, the risk must be one that the 
individual personally faces.125 It is not enough that the country to 
which the individual would be returned is one where there exists 
a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant, or mass violations of 
 
122. See David Weissbrodt & Isabel Hortreiter, The Principle of Non-Refoulement: 
Article 3 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment in Comparison with the Non-Refoulement Provisions of Other International 
Human Rights Treaties, 5 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 8 (1999). 
123. CAT, supra note 96, art. 1. 
124. J. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 
AGAINST TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER 
CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT 120 (1988). 
125. KALIN & KUNZLI, supra note 91, at 493–94. 
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human rights.126 Furthermore, the individual must meet the 
initial burden of showing there are “substantial grounds for 
believing” he would be in danger of being subjected to torture in 
the future if refouled.127 The Committee against Torture, whose 
role it is to supervise compliance with CAT, offers the view that 
“substantial grounds for believing” suggests a risk of future 
torture “beyond mere theory or suspicion,” but not at the level of 
“being highly probable.”128 However, while the Committee’s 
views and interpretations129 of treaty language do provide some 
guidance to states, its views, and even its decisions in individual 
cases, are not binding.130 
Rather, under CAT, states are charged with implementing 
the terms of Article 3 into their own domestic laws, and the 
precise terms of various state laws regarding non-refoulement to 
face torture will differ as a result.131 For example, the United 
States has expressly stated that it understands the “substantial 
grounds” language in Article 3 to mean “it is more likely than 
not” that the individual would be tortured.132 Canada, on the 
 
126. See U.N. Comm. against Torture [UNCAT], General Comment No. 1: 
Implementation of Article 3 of the Convention in the Context of Article 22, ¶¶ 6–7, 
U.N. Doc. A/53/44 (Nov. 21, 1997) [hereinafter General Comment No. 1]. The 
Committee against Torture assesses the particular circumstances of each case to 
determine whether the particular individual risks being subjected to torture. It 
considers, among other things, whether the state concerned exhibits “a pattern of gross, 
flagrant or mass violations of human rights.” Id. However, even if there are indications 
that torture is regularly practiced in the state, the individual must still show that he is 
personally in danger of being tortured. See UNCAT, Mutombo v. Switzerland, Commc’n 
No. 13/1993, ¶ 9.3, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/12/D/13/1993 (Apr. 27, 1994). 
127. See General Comment No. 1, supra note 126, ¶ 5; WOUTERS, supra note 90, at 
484–87; Weissbrodt & Hortreiter, supra note 122, at 14–15. 
128. See General Comment No. 1, supra note 126, ¶¶ 6, 7; UNCAT, R.K. v. Sweden, 
Commc’n No. 306/2006, ¶ 8.3, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/40/D/309/2006 (May 19, 2008) 
(“[T]he Committee has determined that the risk of torture must be foreseeable, real 
and personal.”). 
129. The International Court of Justice has authority to offer binding 
interpretations of CAT’s provisions, but it has not yet had the opportunity to provide its 
views. See WOUTERS, supra note 90, at 432. 
130. See, e.g., CAT, supra note 96, art. 22(7); AHCENE BOULESBAA, THE U.N. 
CONVENTION ON TORTURE AND THE PROSPECTS FOR ENFORCEMENT 63 (1999). The 
Committee itself has noted that its views are only declaratory. UNCAT, Aemei v. 
Switzerland, Commc’n No. 34/1995, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/18/D/34/1995 (May 29, 
1997). Therefore, the Committee generally relies on moral persuasion to convince state 
parties to follow its views and opinions. 
131. GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 108, at 221, 297. 
132. See Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment—Ratification and Accession of the United States, ¶ 2, Oct. 
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other hand, has broadened the protection available to 
individuals under Article 3 and prohibits returning one to a 
country where he would face cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment, as opposed to only torture as defined by CAT.133 
Furthermore, it is the courts of the state party to which 
individuals facing torture must initially apply for protection 
against refoulement. Individuals may only apply to the Committee 
against Torture for protection if the state in which they seek to 
remain is party to Article 22 of CAT,134 and even then, the 
individual must have exhausted all potential state avenues for 
relief.135 As of June 2010, forty-four states were party to Article 
22.136 As noted above, even if the Committee determines that the 
individual may not be returned because he faces a substantial 
danger of being tortured, the Committee has no power to force 
the state to comply with its decision, though it can, and will, 
make efforts to persuade the country to adopt its views.137 
D. The ICCPR Non-Refoulement Provision 
The ICCPR was adopted in 1966 and entered into force in 
1976. Together with the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”), and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, it forms the International Bill of 
Human Rights.138 While the ICCPR legally binds states to protect 
a variety of human rights, it does not specifically contain a non-
 
21, 1994, 1830 U.N.T.S. 322; see also United Nations, Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Declarations and 
Reservations, http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter% 
20IV/IV-9.en.pdf [hereinafter CAT Declarations and Reservations] (last visited Dec. 1, 
2010). 
133. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 2001, S.C. 2001, c. 27, § 97(1) 
(Can.). 
134. See CAT, supra note 96, art. 22(1). Under Article 22, state parties agree that 
UNCAT may receive and consider communications from individuals who claim to be a 
victim of a violation of CAT by a state party—including a violation of the Article 3 
prohibition on refoulement to face torture. 
135. Id. art. 22(5)(b). 
136. See generally CAT Declarations and Reservations, supra note 132. 
137. See WOUTERS, supra note 90, at 431; see also Weissbrodt & Hortreiter, supra 
note 122, at 17 (stating that the Committee cannot reach binding decisions, but rather 
reviews petitions and forwards its opinions regarding the merits to the state party and 
the individual concerned). 
138. See Thomas Buergenthal, The Normative and Institutional Evolution of 
International Human Rights, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 703, 705 & n.7, 708 n.24 (1997). 
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refoulement provision. Rather, the duty of states to refrain from 
returning individuals to states where they would be subjected to 
torture has been implied by the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee—the committee responsible for implementation of 
the ICCPR.139 That Committee has held that parties to the ICCPR 
shall not remove a person to another country “where there are 
substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of 
irreparable harm, such as that contemplated by articles 6 and 7” 
of the treaty.140 Article 6 protects the right to life, proscribes the 
arbitrary deprivation of life, and regulates the imposition of the 
death penalty.141 Article 7 provides, “No one shall be subjected to 
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his 
free consent to medical or scientific experimentation.”142 
According to the Committee, states must not expose individuals 
to any of the dangers listed above by virtue of their extradition, 
expulsion, or refoulement.143 
The ICCPR itself provides no definition of torture or the 
other forms of proscribed ill-treatment or punishment. However, 
at least in some respects, the Human Rights Committee has 
interpreted the ICCPR’s protections against refoulement as being 
broader than those contained in CAT. By its General Comments, 
the Committee has stated that Article 7 protects against acts 
 
139. The ICCPR established the Human Rights Committee pursuant to Article 28. 
The Committee’s main role is to ensure state accountability through its power to review 
and comment on reports that states are required to submit under Article 40—reports in 
which states are to detail the measures they have adopted to give effect to the 
pronouncements contained in the ICCPR. See ICCPR, supra note 97, arts. 28, 40. 
140. See U.N. Human Rights Committee, 80th Sess., General Comment No. 31: 
Nature of the General Obligation on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004). 
141. See ICCPR, supra note 97, art. 6. 
142. Id. art. 7. 
143. In its General Comment No. 20 on Article 7, the U.N. Human Rights 
Committee stated that, in its view, “States parties must not expose individuals to the 
danger of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment upon 
return to another country by way of their extradition, expulsion or refoulement.” 44th 
Sess., General Comment No. 20: Replaces General Comment 7 Concerning Prohibition 
of Torture and Cruel Treatment or Punishment (Art. 7), ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. 
HRI/GEN/I/Rev.1 (Mar. 10, 1992); see U.N. Human Rights Committee, General 
Comment No. 31, supra note 140, ¶ 12. 
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committed by persons acting in their private capacity as well as 
persons acting in an official capacity.144 
According to the Human Rights Committee, to avoid 
refoulement under the ICCPR, the individual must meet the initial 
burden of showing “substantial grounds for believing that there 
is a real risk” of being subjected to torture, or other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.145 The 
applicant generally has the burden of initially producing detailed 
information to support his claim.146 The state must then assess 
the claim and submit substantive grounds for its position 
regarding refoulement.147 
Again, it is the state that has primary responsibility for 
determining whether individual applicants are entitled to 
protection against refoulement under the ICCPR. Individuals may 
only bring claims before the Human Rights Committee if the 
state in which they seek to remain is a party to the Optional 
Protocol to the ICCPR148 and if they have exhausted all domestic 
avenues for relief.149 As of June 2010, 113 states were party to the 
ICCPR’s Optional Protocol.150 To date, however, the Committee 
has considered only a very few cases involving a claim to be 
protected against refoulement under Article 6 or 7 of the ICCPR.151 
As such, there is little case law to aid in interpreting the exact 
scope of any non-refoulement obligation under the treaty. In fact, 
 
144. U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 20, supra note 143, ¶ 
2; U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, supra note 140, ¶ 8. 
145. See U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, supra note 140, 
¶ 12. 
146. WOUTERS, supra note 90, at 396. 
147. Id. at 396–97. 
148. See Optional Protocol to the ICCPR art. 1, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 
999 U.N.T.S. 302, 302 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976). 
149. See id. art. 2. 
150. See UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION (Feb. 12, 2010), 
http://treaties.un.org/ doc/ Publication/ MTDSG/ Volume%20I/Chapter%20IV/IV-
5.en.pdf. 
151. Wouters found that as of August 2008, the Human Rights Committee had only 
considered the merits of a refoulement claim under Article 7 of the ICCPR in eleven cases. 
Of the eleven cases, five involved extradition. See WOUTERS, supra note 90, at 367 & n.41. 
This author’s own research post-August 2008 did not reveal additional Article 6 or 7 
cases in the refoulement context that addressed the merits of the issue (two cases were 
deemed inadmissible). See UN Human Rights Committee, Wilfred v. Canada, Commc’n 
No. 1638/2007, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/94/D/1638/2007 (Nov. 18, 2008); UN Human 
Rights Committee, Esposito v. Spain, Commc’n No. 1359/2005, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/89/D/1359/2005 (May 30, 2007). 
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many of the cases the Committee has considered under Article 6 
or 7 concern claims seeking to avoid extradition to face charges 
that carry a potential death sentence.152 In any event, even in 
those cases where the Committee does determine the individual 
is protected against refoulement under the ICCPR, those 
determinations are not binding on state parties. As with the CAT 
Committee, the committee overseeing the ICCPR is limited to 
persuading the state to accept its views.153 The United States, for 
example, does not accept the Committee’s conclusion that the 
ICCPR creates a non-refoulement obligation. It argues that the text 
of the ICCPR contains no such prohibition on refoulement and has 
expressly stated that it does not intend to be bound to any non-
refoulement obligation under the ICCPR.154 Although the 
Committee has expressed concern with the United States’ refusal 
to adopt the Committee’s interpretation of Articles 6 and 7,155 
the United States still maintains that the ICCPR does not give rise 
to a non-refoulement obligation.156 
E. The ECHR Non-Refoulement Provision 
The ECHR was adopted in 1950 and entered into force in 
1953. All forty-seven member states of the Council of Europe 
have ratified it.157 Although it too contains no specific non-
 
152. See WOUTERS, supra note 90, at 391–94. 
153. See GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 108, at 297. Of course, Wouters 
makes the point that if a state has committed to the optional procedures for individual 
complaints, one may expect that the state will honor the views of the Committee and 
that the Committee’s views in individual cases will be instructive. WOUTERS, supra note 
90, at 366–67. 
154. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, LIST OF ISSUES TO BE TAKEN UP IN CONNECTION WITH 
THE CONSIDERATION OF THE SECOND AND THIRD PERIODIC REPORTS OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA (2006). 
155. See U.N. Human Rights Committee, 87th Sess., Consideration of Reports 
Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations 
of the Human Rights Committee: United States of America, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/USA/CO/3 (Dec. 18, 2006). 
156. See U.N. Human Rights Committee, Consideration of Reports Submitted by 
States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: United States of America, Addendum: 
Comments by the Government of the United States of America on the Concluding 
Observations of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/USA/CO/Rev.1/Add.1, 8–10 (Feb. 12, 2008). The United States, however, 
does acknowledge that it is bound by CAT not to refoule persons where the evidence 
demonstrates “it is more likely than not” that the individual would be tortured. See id. 
157. See DAVID HARRIS ET AL., LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS 1–2 (2d ed. 2009). 
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refoulement provision, one has been implied.158 The European 
Court of Human Rights is empowered to interpret the 
convention,159 and in Soering v. United Kingdom, it held that 
Article 3 of the ECHR160 prohibits refoulement to countries where 
there are “substantial grounds” to believe that the individual 
would face a “real risk of . . . torture or to inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.”161 Based on Article 3, the court has 
developed a body of case law that has become a strong safeguard 
against refoulement.162 For example, the protections of Article 3 
cannot be derogated in time of war or other public emergency.163 
Nor can even the highest interests of the public—such as to fight 
terrorism164 or to protect national security165—justify state actions 
that would breach Article 3. Furthermore, the protections of 
Article 3 of the ECHR are available to everyone, regardless of 
 
158. See, e.g., Chahal v. United Kingdom, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1831, 1853; Soering 
v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34–35 (1989). 
159. See ECHR, supra note 98, art. 32(1). 
160. “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment.” Id. art. 3. 
161. See Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 35; see also Chahal, 1996-V Eur. Ct. 
H.R. at 1853. 
162. Until the entry into force of the Eleventh Protocol to the ECHR on November 
1, 1998, the ECHR provided for a European Commission on Human Rights, which was 
the initial stage at which individual applications for relief under the Convention were 
considered. The Commission’s role was to either broker a friendly settlement or to 
consider the case on the merits and issue a non-binding report. Thereafter, the case 
would be referred to the Committee of Ministers, the Council of Europe, or the 
European Court of Human Rights. With the Eleventh Protocol, the Commission was 
abolished, and presently only the European Court of Human Rights interprets and 
applies the ECHR. See WOUTERS, supra note 90, at 198–99. However, where the Court 
has not spoken on an issue, some pre-1998 Commission interpretations remain 
authoritative. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 157, at 17. 
163. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 65 (1978). 
164. See Tomasi v. France, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 33 (1992). 
165. See Chahal, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at 1855 (holding that the absolute character 
of Article 3 did not permit deportation to India if there was a real risk of ill-treatment, 
irrespective of the applicant’s conduct, and notwithstanding that such conduct may pose 
dangers to the country’s national security). Indeed, the court noted that the protection 
against refoulement under Article 3 is wider than that provided under Article 33 of the 
Refugee Convention, which contains exceptions. See id.; see also Saadi v. Italy, No. 
37201/66, ¶¶ 138, 141 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 28, 2008), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/
docid/47c6882e2.html (confirming its decision in Chahal and holding that potential 
danger to a state’s national security or community cannot influence a determination 
under Article 3 as to whether or not the individual would face a real risk of ill-treatment 
at the country of return). 
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their character or their past criminal conduct.166 Moreover, 
claims that the applicant will be ill-treated by private, as well as 
public actors, may give rise to a non-refoulement obligation under 
Article 3 if the evidence shows that the state would be unable to 
protect the applicant from the private actors concerned.167 
To obtain protection against refoulement under Article 3 of 
the ECHR, the individual must present a credible claim 
containing sufficient facts and circumstances to show he will be 
subjected to a real risk of torture or ill-treatment in the country 
of return.168 The initial burden of presenting evidence of a “real 
risk” is on the applicant, after which the state has the burden of 
assessing the claim and gathering any additional relevant 
information regarding it.169 The necessary risk level is “a real, 
personal, foreseeable or likely risk which goes beyond a mere 
possibility but does not need to be certain or highly probable.”170 
For a risk to be real and personal, it must relate to the individual; 
the applicant must show particular circumstances that put him in 
danger of harm.171 The general situation in the country of 
 
166. See KALIN & KUNZLI, supra note 91, at 494–95. For example, in Ahmed v. 
Austria, the court held that if the applicant faced a real risk of being subjected to ill-
treatment in Somalia, the applicant’s criminal record was not material to the state’s 
consideration of whether he was entitled to protection under Article 3 of the ECHR. 
1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2195, 2208. 
167. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 157, at 88; KALIN & KUNZLI, supra note 91, at 495; 
WOUTERS, supra note 90, at 225. In H.L.R. v. France, the court stated that it would not 
rule out the possibility that Article 3 may “also apply where the danger emanates from 
persons or groups of persons who are not public officials.” However, it noted that the 
risk must be real and the authorities of the receiving state must not be able “to obviate 
the risk by providing appropriate protection.” 1997-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 745, 758. 
168. The ECHR itself does not define torture nor inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment, but the court has suggested that torture is the most severe form of ill-
treatment, and requires an element of intent to cause serious and cruel suffering. See 
Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 66–67. Degrading treatment or 
punishment is less severe, but precisely what constitutes such treatment will depend on 
the facts and circumstances of the case. See WOUTERS, supra note 90, at 221–22, 238–40; 
see also HARRIS ET AL., supra note 157, at 70. The possibility of facing socio-economic 
harms upon return, however, is not the type of ill-treatment against which Article 3 
protects. See WOUTERS, supra note 90, at 240–41. 
169. See WOUTERS, supra note 90, at 274. 
170. See id. at 247. Wouters formulated this risk statement based on the court’s 
language in several cases: Cruz Varas v. Sweden, 201 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 28 (1991); 
Vilvarajah v. United Kingdom, 215 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 36, 37 (1991); and Soering v. 
United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34–35 (1989). 
171. For example, in Vilvarajah, the court concluded that there was no violation of 
Article 3 based on returning applicants to Sri Lanka where the evidence did not indicate 
that the applicants were personally being singled out for ill-treatment, but rather, faced 
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return—even where massive human rights violations are 
occurring—does not alone give rise to a claim under Article 3.172 
As is the case with the other treaties, the state parties have 
primary responsibility for ensuring that the rights and guarantees 
of the ECHR are provided to persons within their jurisdiction.173 
Claims alleging breaches of the convention’s terms must first be 
brought before national courts.174 However, of the treaties 
discussed, the ECHR provides for significantly more binding 
oversight of state practices as regards treaty interpretation and 
enforcement. For example, all state parties to the ECHR are 
automatically subject to the jurisdiction of the European Court of 
Human Rights.175 In addition, both states and individuals are 
entitled to bring claims alleging breaches of the convention’s 
terms.176 In particular, pursuant to Article 34, state parties agree 
that “any person, non-governmental organization or group of 
individuals,” regardless of nationality, may bring an application 
claiming to be a victim of a breach of the convention.177 The 
European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg178 has 
jurisdiction over all such claims as long as all domestic remedies 
have been exhausted.179 
 
no greater threat of ill-treatment than did all Tamils, given the political situation in Sri 
Lanka. Vilvarajah, 215 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 37. 
172. See id.; see also H.L.R. v. France, 1997-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at 758–59 (holding that 
deportation to Colombia was not in violation of Article 3 where applicant pointed only 
to the general situation of violence in Colombia, and did not show other factors 
indicating that he would be personally targeted for ill-treatment). 
173. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 157, at 13, 23. Article 1 of the ECHR requires the 
parties to “secure” the rights of the Convention. ECHR, supra note 98, art. 1. 
174. See ECHR, supra note 98, art. 35(1); see also HARRIS ET AL., supra note 157, at 
23. Pursuant to Article 13 of the ECHR, states are required to provide an “effective 
remedy” under national law for individuals who have arguable claims under the 
Convention. ECHR, supra art. 13. 
175. GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 108, at 298. 
176. See ECHR, supra note 98, arts. 33–34. 
177. The Eleventh Protocol to the ECHR made this obligation to accept individual 
complaints compulsory as of 1998. See id. art. 34. 
178. Section II of the ECHR discusses the establishment of the court and the 
election of judges. ECHR, supra note 98, § 2. 
179. See id. art. 35(1). Although the European Court of Human Rights does have a 
significant role in enforcing state non-refoulement obligations under Article 3, it has not 
actually issued an enormous number of decisions in that context since 1989—the year it 
first stated that Article 3 contained a prohibition against refoulement. As of August 2008, 
Wouters found that the court had only delivered a decision on a complaint under 
Article 3 of the ECHR involving a refoulement situation in twenty-nine cases. Of those 
twenty-nine, nineteen concerned the return of aliens in the asylum context. See 
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Unlike the decisions of the bodies responsible for 
overseeing the other treaties discussed above, the decisions of the 
European Court of Human Rights are binding on the parties to 
the claim.180 State compliance with the court’s judgments is 
monitored by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe,181 which is comprised of government representatives of 
the various member states.182 However, even if the court 
determines that refoulement is prohibited by Article 3 of the 
convention, it will not specify what legal status the state should 
accord the applicant.183 
III. ARE PIRATES LIKELY TO SUCCEED IN ESTABLISHING A 
RIGHT TO ASYLUM AND PROTECTION AGAINST 
REFOULEMENT UNDER INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW? 
A. The Persecution Requirement 
Pirates should not be able to meet the definition of a 
“refugee” under the Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol 
(nor receive its protections against refoulement) because they are 
likely unable to demonstrate the “well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership 
of a particular social group or political opinion”184 that would 
prevent them from being returned to their country of origin. 
The evidence relating to pirates indicates that they are anything 
but a persecuted group; rather they are individuals who hijack 
ships and hold innocent crew hostage in exchange for ransom 
payments. Moreover, any convicted pirates would only be in the 
country in which they were seeking asylum because they were 
captured committing illegal acts, not because they were fleeing 
some circumstances that caused them to feel persecuted.185 
 
WOUTERS, supra note 90, at 188–89 & nn.7–8. This author’s research post-August 2008 
revealed only eleven more decisions in the refoulement context under Article 3. 
180. See ECHR, supra note 98, art. 46(1). 
181. See id. art. 46(2). 
182. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 157, at 5. 
183. GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 108, at 297. 
184. See Refugee Convention, supra note 95, art. 1(A)(2). 
185. In the case of Somalia, the UNHCR has stated that some individuals may 
qualify for refugee status under the Refugee Convention on the grounds that they fled 
their country because of the dangers associated with the armed conflict or generalized 
violence in the country, particularly where the conflict is rooted in religious, ethnic, and 
political disputes and where specific groups are being targeted. See UNHCR, Eligibility 
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Indeed, even if the pirates could argue that they did not want to 
return to their country of origin because of instability or poor 
circumstances, this should not be enough to satisfy the “refugee” 
definition. The UNHCR Refugee Handbook notes that poor 
conditions in a country alone will not entitle one to international 
protection as a refugee; the individual must show good reason 
why he individually fears persecution.186 
It is true that some Somalis have been able to establish a 
well-founded fear of persecution or other ill-treatment by 
demonstrating their membership in a minority clan or tribe that 
is subjected to persecution because control of the area where 
they live is in the hands of some other clan or tribe that 
discriminates—sometimes violently—against them.187 Even in 
those circumstances, however, some individuals may be returned 
to Somalia where there is an internal flight or relocation 
alternative,188 namely, to an area of Somalia where the individual 
would be safe from persecution.189 
 
Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from 
Somalia, 38, U.N. Doc. HCR/EG/SOM/10/1 (May 5, 2010) [hereinafter UNHCR 
Somalia Eligibility Guidelines]. As noted above, however, this consideration should not 
be relevant to most pirates since they would not be in the country of refuge to flee 
Somalia: they would only be in the country of refuge because they were captured 
committing criminal acts that affect the international community. 
186. See UNHCR Refugee Handbook, supra note 110, ¶¶ 37–39. 
187. See, e.g., Sheekh v. Netherlands, App. No. 1948/04, ¶¶ 139–40, 146 (Eur. Ct. 
H.R. Jan. 11, 2007), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=
html&documentId=812685&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=
F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649 (holding that returning a member of the 
Ashraf minority clan who fled Somalia because of intimidation and assaults by persons in 
control would constitute a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR since evidence showed he 
faced real risk of ill-treatment if returned to “relatively safe” areas of Somalia); Refugee 
Appeal No. 76062 [Oct. 15, 2007] New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals Authority, 
Auckland, ¶¶ 87–91, available at http:// www.nzrefugeeappeals. govt.nz/ PDFs/ Ref_ 
20071015_ 76062.pdf (holding that the applicant showed a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted on the basis of race as member of a minority clan, the Bantu Tunni Torre, by 
members of controlling clans, entitling him to “refugee” status within the meaning of 
the Refugee Convention). 
188. The internal flight or relocation alternative is premised on the idea that some 
claims of persecution are limited to a specific part of the country (for example, because 
the locale is controlled by some majority that discriminates against the minority 
population of which the applicant is a member) and absent in another part. Where an 
individual can be returned to a part of his country of origin where he will not be 
subjected to persecution, international protection is unnecessary. See, e.g., UNHCR 
Somalia Eligibility Guidelines, supra note 185, at 33; WOUTERS, supra note 90, at 104–05. 
189. According to the UNHCR, it may be possible to internally relocate some 
Somalis to Somaliland or Puntland if, for example, the individual is a member of a 
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In any event, Somali pirates should not be among the 
individuals who are able to show persecution because control of 
an area is in the hands of persons who discriminate against them. 
Pirates in Somalia are adding to the instability of the country in 
the hopes of profiting wildly from their illegal activities, and they 
also tend to control the parts of the country where they operate 
and live. A recent report of the UNHCR notes that several parts 
of southern and central Somalia are under pirate control.190 The 
Nairobi Report, which was issued by an international expert 
group on piracy occurring off the Somali coast, states that, as of 
2008, the Puntland region of Somalia is an epicenter of piracy 
and that it operates at all levels of society, including within 
government.191 Of course, circumstances may change by the time 
convicted pirates serve their sentences. But, at present, there is 
little reason to believe that pirates would be able to demonstrate 
a well-founded fear of persecution based on their characteristics 
or beliefs, including their membership in a minority clan or 
tribe. 
B. Article 1(F) Exclusion 
Even if pirates could establish a well-founded fear of 
persecution, however, they must be excluded from the definition 
of “refugee” by operation of Article 1(F) because there are 
“serious reasons for considering” that they have committed the 
types of non-political crimes that make them undeserving of 
international protection.192 Specifically, assuming they have 
 
majority or minority clan or originates from the area. The existence of armed conflict in 
southern and central Somalia has caused the UNHCR to conclude that presently there is 
no available internal flight or relocation alternative in those areas. See UNHCR Somalia 
Eligibility Guidelines, supra note 185, at 34–35. However, as of August 2010, and 
although it is being criticized by human rights organizations and others, the 
Netherlands has entered into a memorandum of understanding (the terms of which had 
not been disclosed to the public) with the Transitional Federal Government (“TFG”) of 
Somalia whereby rejected asylum seekers can be forcibly returned to the area near 
Mogadishu, which is controlled by the TFG. See Marike Peters, Dutch Deportation of 
Somalis “a Death Sentence,” RADIO NETHERLANDS WORLDWIDE, July 22, 2010, available at 
http://www.rnw.nl/english/print/144701; Amnesty International, Netherlands: 
Government Must Stop Imminent Deportation of Somalis, AI Index EUR 35/002/2010 (July 
27, 2010). 
190. UNHCR Somalia Eligibility Guidelines, supra note 185, at 7. 
191. PIRACY OFF THE SOMALI COAST: FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 17. 
192. See Refugee Convention, supra note 95, art. 1(F); see also UNHCR Refugee 
Handbook, supra note 110, ¶ 140 (noting that Article 1(F) of the Refugee Convention 
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committed violent and egregious acts such as murder or 
hijacking in the course of a pirate attack, pirates would probably 
meet the Article 1(F)(b) exclusion since they have committed “a 
serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge” prior 
to admission to that country of refuge.193 Although states may 
differ in how they define “serious crimes,” the UNCHR Refugee 
Handbook suggests that a “serious crime” is a “capital crime or a 
very grave punishable act.”194 Acts like murder and hijacking 
would meet this definition.195 Pirates should also be unable to 
claim their acts were political: acts are non-political where they 
are committed for personal reasons such as financial gain,196 
 
lists the categories of persons who are not considered deserving of international 
protection); UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: Application of the 
Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 
¶ 3, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/03/05 (Sept. 4, 2003), available at http://www.unhcr.org/
3f7d48514.html [hereinafter UNHCR Article 1F Exclusion Guidelines]. Article 1(F)(b) 
implements the language of Article 14(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
by which the right to asylum “may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely 
arising from non-political crimes.” Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 
91, art. 14(2), at 74. 
193. Refugee Convention, supra note 95, art. 1(F)(b). Even egregious acts of piracy 
would not likely meet the Article 1(F)(a) exclusion criteria because the acts prohibited 
by that section are crimes against peace, war crimes, or crimes against humanity as 
defined in international instruments. See UNHCR Article 1F Exclusion Guidelines, supra 
note 192, ¶¶ 11–13. Crimes against peace are essentially tantamount to crimes arising 
from the planning, preparation, or initiation of a war of aggression. See WOUTERS, supra 
note 90, at 122–23 (citing the definition of a “crime against peace” from the 1945 
Charter of the International Military Tribunal). War crimes involve attacks committed in 
times of armed conflict against those not participating or no longer participating in 
hostilities. See Rome Statute, supra note 86, art. 8. Although “crimes against humanity” 
contemplates egregious crimes, like murder and rape that might be part of a pirate 
attack, to constitute a crime against humanity, the acts must be committed “as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack” directed against a civilian population. See id. art. 7(1). 
The UNHCR Article 1F Exclusion Guidelines suggest that an isolated act can “constitute 
a crime against humanity if it is part of a coherent system or a series of systematic and 
repeated acts.” UNHCR Article 1F Exclusion Guidelines, supra note 192, ¶ 13. 
194. UNHCR Refugee Handbook, supra note 110, ¶ 155; UNHCR Article 1F 
Exclusion Guidelines, supra note 192, ¶ 14. 
195. See, e.g., UNHCR Refugee Handbook, supra note 110, ¶ 155; UNHCR Article 
1F Exclusion Guidelines, supra note 192, ¶ 14. Indeed, most of the offenses with which a 
pirate was charged in the Southern District of New York carried potential sentences of 
between twenty years and life imprisonment. See Press Release, United States Attorney, 
Southern District of New York, Somali Pirate Pleads Guilty in Manhattan Federal Court 
to Maritime Hijackings, Kidnappings, and Hostage Takings (May 18, 2010), available at 
http://www.ncis.navy.mil/PubNewsRoom/hlites/News%20Articles/
NCIS%20assists%20in%20conviction%20of%20Somali%20pirates.pdf. 
196. UNHCR Refugee Handbook, supra note 110, ¶ 152; UNHCR Article 1F 
Exclusion Guidelines, supra note 192, ¶ 15. In Aguirre-Aguirre v. INS, the US Supreme 
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which is precisely why modern-day pirates are hijacking ships and 
demanding huge ransom payments.197 Furthermore, the pirate 
acts will necessarily have been committed outside the country of 
refuge.198 
Regarding Somalia, in particular, pirates are among the 
types of criminals that the UNHCR cautions states to consider 
excluding from refugee status.199 It advises states to pay particular 
attention to, among others, those who are members of “criminal 
gangs.”200 It defines those gangs to include individuals, such as 
former militias, who are “lured into criminal activities for the 
financial rewards from activities such as kidnapping and the 
lucrative business of boarding ships in the Gulf of Aden or the 
 
Court suggested that political crimes were those where the political aspect of the offense 
outweighs its common-law character. 526 U.S. 415, 422 (1999). 
197. See supra Part I.A. 
198. The UNHCR suggests that states should weigh the gravity of the offense in 
question against the consequences of exclusion—namely the likelihood of persecution 
and its severity—when determining whether an individual must be excluded under 
Article 1(F)(b). See UNHCR Refugee Handbook, supra note 110, ¶ 156; UNHCR Article 
1F Exclusion Guidelines, supra note 192, ¶ 24. However, not all states agree that such 
balancing is appropriate. In Aguirre-Aguirre, the US Supreme Court stated that balancing 
was not appropriate under Article 1(F)(b), noting that “it is not obvious that an already-
completed crime is somehow rendered less serious by considering the further 
circumstance that the alien may be subject to persecution if returned to his home 
country.” 526 U.S. at 426. The United Kingdom has also rejected applying a balancing 
test when applying Article 1(F). See Helene Lambert, The EU Asylum Qualification 
Directive, Its Impact on the Jurisprudence of the United Kingdom and International Law, 55 
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 161, 175 (2006); see also Gil v. Canada (Minister of Employment and 
Immigration) [1995] 1 F.C. 508, 534–35 (Can. Fed. Ct. 1994) (“[T]he claimant to whom 
the exclusion clause applies is ex hypothesi in danger of persecution; the crime which 
he has committed is by definition ‘serious.’ . . . It is not in the public interest that this 
country should become a safe haven for mass bombers.”). Professors Hathaway and 
Harvey, similarly, argue that because asylum seekers described in Article 1(F)(b) could 
not qualify for refugee status within the meaning of the Refugee Convention, states are 
under no duty to consider the merits of a protection claim made by such persons. 
Hathaway & Harvey, supra note 103, at 264. In any event, those pirates that have 
committed murders or similarly grave offenses would not likely benefit from a balancing 
test in any event. Indeed, by way of example, the UNHCR has commented that “a 
person guilty of deliberate infliction of serious harm to or killing of civilians outside the 
scope of combat would not benefit from proportionality considerations.” UNHCR, 
Statement on Article 1F of the 1951 Convention, July 2009, at 35, available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/4a5edac09.html [hereinafter UNHCR 2009 1F Statement]. 
199. See UNHCR Somalia Eligibility Guidelines, supra note 185, at 35 (“In light of 
Somalia’s long history of armed conflict, serious human rights violations and 
transgressions of international humanitarian law, exclusion considerations under Article 
1F of the 1951 Convention may arise in relation to individual asylum claims by Somali 
asylum-seekers.”). 
200. See id. at 35–37. 
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Indian [Ocean] and holding them, their crews and cargos for 
ransoms.”201 Thus, although the UNHCR will still expect states to 
consider the specific facts and circumstances associated with each 
application for protection under the Refugee Convention, 
pirates who belong to criminal gangs and have committed violent 
acts against seafarers should come within Article 1(F)’s exclusion 
provision denying refugee status to those who have committed 
serious non-political crimes. 
One question that arises is whether conduct will still be 
considered a crime leading to exclusion from refugee status 
under Article 1(F)(b) if the applicant has already been convicted 
and served his sentence. Professors Hathaway and Harvey argue 
that the preparatory documents leading to the Refugee 
Convention suggest that Article 1(F)(b) is intended to exclude 
fugitives and to ensure that refugee law does not impede state 
obligations under extradition treaties.202 They therefore suggest 
that persons who have committed crimes within the state of 
refuge and persons whose crimes are no longer justiciable do not 
fall within Article 1(F)(b).203 
Nevertheless, they also recognize that not all commentators 
or states agree that Article 1(F)(b) is so limited.204 For example, 
the UNHCR Refugee Handbook advises that states should 
consider both aggravating and mitigating circumstances when 
making exclusion determinations under Article 1(F)(b). 
Whether an individual has served his time is among those 
mitigating factors, but that fact alone does not require states to 
conclude that the individual cannot be excluded for having 
committed a serious non-political crime outside the country.205 In 
addition, more recent guidance from the UNHCR indicates that, 
although the exclusion clauses should be interpreted in a 
restrictive manner,206 states may still be justified in excluding 
individuals who have committed grave and heinous crimes, even 
if the individual has been pardoned or was granted amnesty for 
 
201. See id. at 37 n.279. 
202. Hathaway & Harvey, supra note 103, at 299–301. 
203. See id. 
204. See id. at 299–304. 
205. UNHCR Refugee Handbook, supra note 110, ¶ 157. 
206. UNHCR Article 1F Exclusion Guidelines, supra note 192, ¶ 2. 
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the offense.207 Furthermore, although they criticize the practice 
as being inconsistent with the purpose of Article 1(F)(b), 
Professors Hathaway and Harvey acknowledge that states have 
excluded individuals who have committed serious non-political 
crimes notwithstanding that the individuals had served time for 
their offenses.208 Finally, it is worth pointing out that the 
language of Article 1(F)(b) is not limited to persons who have 
not yet been adjudged guilty and served time for their offenses; it 
speaks only of serious, non-political crimes committed outside 
the country of refuge.209 Accordingly, although some countries 
may choose not to apply Article 1(F)(b) to individuals who have 
served time for their offenses, many will not, and the language of 
the provision and the guidance provided by the UNHCR do not 
require that limitation on the article’s applicability. 
In addition to relying on Article 1(F)(b)’s exclusion 
provision, some states may also conclude that the broadly-worded 
Article 1(F)(c)—which requires excluding individuals who have 
committed “acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the 
United Nations”—is also a basis for refusing to grant protection 
to pirates under the Refugee Convention.210 The UNHCR 
suggests that the language of Article 1(F)(c) is rather unclear 
and, as a result, should be read narrowly.211 It also suggests that 
because Articles 1 and 2 of the United Nations Charter basically 
set out the fundamental principles that states must uphold in 
their mutual relations, it appears that “in principle only persons 
who have been in positions of power in a State or State-like 
 
207. Id. ¶ 23; UNHCR, Background Note on the Application of the Exclusion 
Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Sept. 4, 
2003, ¶ 73, reprinted in 15 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 502 (2003) [hereinafter UNHCR 
Background Note to the Exclusion Clauses]. 
208. Hathaway & Harvey, supra note 103, at 302–03. For example, in Ovcharuk v. 
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the Full Court of the Federal Court of 
Australia concluded that nothing in Article 1(F)(b) required that its application be 
limited only to those criminals who were fugitives from justice who had not already been 
convicted and served time. (1998) 158 ALR 289, 294, 300, 302–04 (Austl.). 
209. In fact, the UNHCR made just this same point. See UNHCR Background Note 
to the Exclusion Clauses, supra note 207, ¶ 72; see also GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra 
note 108, at 175 (suggesting that the “fugitives from justice” thesis appears to be losing 
favor as being inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of the words in Article 1(F)(b), 
which contains no such limitation on its application). 
210. Refugee Convention, supra note 95, art. 1(F)(c). 
211. See UNHCR Article 1F Exclusion Guidelines, supra note 192, ¶ 17. 
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entity” would appear capable of committing acts contrary to the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations.212 
However, the UNHCR, like other commentators and courts, 
has now stated that the broad language of the clause permits 
other interpretations. In fact, the UNHCR acknowledges that the 
present reality is one where individuals and groups other than 
those in government can be responsible for acts—such as acts of 
terrorism—which are contrary to the principles and purposes of 
the United Nations.213 For example, in Pushpanathan v. Canada, 
the Supreme Court of Canada concluded that Article 1(F)(c) 
applies to “individuals responsible for serious, sustained, or 
systematic violations of fundamental human rights which amount 
to persecution in a non-war setting” and “where there is 
consensus in international law that particular acts constitute 
sufficiently serious and sustained violations of fundamental 
human rights as to amount to persecution, or are explicitly 
recognized as contrary to purposes and principles of the United 
Nations.”214 In sum, although the precise contours of the Article 
1(F)(c) exclusion clause are far from settled,215 in some 
circumstances, individual pirates and the acts they commit may 
be excludable under this provision if they are not already 
excludable under Article 1(F)(b). 
C. Article 33 (2) Exceptions to the Non-Refoulement Principle 
Article 33(2)’s “security of the country” and “danger to the 
community” exceptions may also operate in some circumstances 
to bar convicted pirates who otherwise are able to meet the 
“refugee” definition from the Refugee Convention’s refoulement 
protection.216 Generally speaking, Article 33(2)’s exceptions 
should be interpreted restrictively and may only be applied if 
necessary and proportionate, which means that there must be a 
rational connection between removing the refugee and the 
 
212. See id. 
213. See UNHCR 2009 1F Statement, supra note 198, at 28–29. 
214. Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [1998] 1 
S.C.R. 982, ¶¶ 64, 65 (Can.). 
215. See GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 108, at 189–90; WOUTERS, supra 
note 90, at 126. 
216. According to the UNHCR, Article 1(F) “is aimed at preserving the integrity of 
the refugee protection regime,” while “Article 33(2) concerns protection of the national 
security of the host country.” See UNHCR 2009 1F Statement, supra note 198, at 8. 
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elimination of the danger resulting from his presence in the state 
or community in which he is seeking refuge.217 According to the 
UNHCR, refoulement must be the last resort, and the state must 
conclude that the danger to the state or community outweighs 
the risks to the refugee if returned to his country of origin.218 
Nonetheless, the United States does not require any 
proportionality assessment under its equivalent of Article 
33(2).219 
The “security of the country” exception, however, is 
probably not applicable in the majority of modern piracy cases 
since it contemplates a showing of future danger that is so serious 
as to be a threat to the national security of the host country.220 
The types of acts that threaten national security are acts aimed at 
overthrowing the government; acts which threaten the country’s 
constitution, peace, and independence; and acts of terrorism and 
espionage.221 
However, convicted pirates may fall within Article 33(2)’s 
“danger to the community” exception. That clause denies 
protection against refoulement to individuals who, “having been 
convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, 
constitute[] a danger to the community” of the country in which 
 
217. See Letter from Thomas Albrecht, UNHCR Deputy Regional Representative, 
to Paul Engelmayer, Esq., WilmerHale, at 1–3 (Jan. 6, 2006), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/43de2da94.pdf [hereinafter UNHCR Request 
for Advisory Opinion]. 
218. See, e.g., id. at 2, 7–8; UNHCR, Note on Diplomatic Assurances and 
International Refugee Protection, Aug. 2006, ¶ 13, available at http://www.unhcr.org/
refworld/docid/44dc81164.html [hereinafter UNHCR Note on Diplomatic Assurances]. 
219. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) denies asylum (which is the equivalent of refugee 
status under the Refugee Convention) to an individual who “having been convicted by a 
final judgment of a particularly serious crime constitutes a danger to the community of 
the United States.” “Withholding of removal” (which is the equivalent of protection 
against refoulement under the Refugee Convention) is not available to an applicant if he, 
“having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, is a danger to 
the community of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii). These provisions do 
not require any consideration of whether refoulement would eliminate the danger or 
whether refoulement is the last possible resort for eliminating the danger posed by the 
individual’s presence in the community. 
220. Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, supra note 107, at 135–36; UNHCR Note on 
Diplomatic Assurances, supra note 218, ¶ 12. 
221. See WOUTERS, supra note 90, at 115; Atle Grahl-Madsen, UNHCR, Division of 
International Protection, Commentary on the Refugee Convention 1951 Articles 2–11, 
13–37, at 140 (1997), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/
4785ee9d2.html (commentary written by Professor Atle Grahl-Madsen in 1963). 
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they are seeking refuge.222 Although there is no universal 
definition for “particularly serious crime,”223 commentators have 
suggested that murder, rape, armed robbery, and arson are 
examples of the types of crimes that would qualify.224 “Danger to 
the community” refers to future danger to the population, rather 
than to the larger interests of the state.225 
One question that arises is the extent to which Article 33(2) 
requires that one convicted of a particularly serious crime must 
also be shown to be a danger to the community. The UNHCR 
and some commentators suggest that the additional showing of 
danger is necessary.226 According to the UNHCR, for the “danger 
to the community” exception to apply, the refugee must have 
been convicted of a very serious crime, and it must be shown 
“that the refugee, in light of the crime and conviction, 
constitutes a very serious present or future danger to the 
community of the host country.”227 The assessment of danger 
may include considerations of the nature of the crime 
committed, the facts concerning its commission, and evidence of 
recidivism or likely recidivism.228 
On the other hand, states are charged with implementing 
the Refugee Convention and are not bound by the UNCHR’s 
interpretations of the convention.229 Thus, in the United States, 
evidence that the individual has been convicted of a particularly 
serious crime operates to also demonstrate that the individual is a 
 
222. Refugee Convention, supra note 95, art. 33(2). 
223. See WOUTERS, supra note 90, at 117. For example, in connection with 
consideration of asylum claims (refugee status under the Refugee Convention), the 
United States defines a “particularly serious crime” as encompassing “aggravated 
felonies,” which include such acts as crimes of violence and theft offenses that carry a 
term of imprisonment of at least one year and offenses relating to ransom demands. See, 
e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i); id. § 1101(a)(43)(F)–(H). In connection with 
consideration of “withholding of removal” claims (refoulement under the Refugee 
Convention), the United States defines a “particularly serious crime” to include 
“aggravated felonies” committed by the alien for which he served an aggregate term of 
imprisonment of at least five years. See id. § 1231 (b)(3)(B)(ii). 
224. See Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, supra note 107, at 139. 
225. See, e.g., WOUTERS, supra note 90, at 116; Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, supra 
note 107, at 138. 
226. See Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, supra note 107, at 140; see also UNHCR Note on 
Diplomatic Assurances, supra note 218, ¶ 12. 
227. UNHCR Note on Diplomatic Assurances, supra note 218, ¶ 12. 
228. GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 108, at 239–40; Lauterpacht & 
Bethlehem, supra note 107, at 140. 
229. See supra notes 108–113 and accompanying text. 
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danger to the community, such that refugee status and the 
protections against refoulement are denied.230 The Eleventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals explained that the plain language of the 
provision—which mirrors Article 33(2) of the Refugee 
Convention—includes no conjunction such as “and” between the 
conviction clause and the danger clause, suggesting that no 
separate determination of dangerousness is required.231 It further 
explained that requiring a separate determination of 
dangerousness would entail evidentiary difficulties relating to 
proving the likelihood of the applicant’s recidivism—a burden it 
concluded that Congress did not intend to impose on the 
conduct of deportation proceedings.232  
In light of the foregoing, it seems that Article 33(2)’s 
“danger to the community” provision would probably bar many 
pirates from protection against refoulement—assuming that any 
pirates were able to even establish refugee status under Article 1 
of the convention. First, pirates convicted of murder, hijacking, 
armed robbery, or other violent acts associated with modern 
piracy will have committed “particularly serious crimes.” As 
noted above, in some jurisdictions like the United States, this 
alone will mean that the pirate is also a danger to the 
community. States should reach the same conclusion that the 
pirate is a danger to the community applying the UNCHR’s test 
that considers the nature and circumstances of the crime 
committed and the likely recidivism of the criminal.  Certainly 
some pirates may claim that their unfortunate circumstances 
caused them to engage in piracy. However, this and other 
arguments are likely to be discounted where the underlying facts 
demonstrate the pirate was involved, for example, in threatening 
innocent seafarers at gunpoint and holding them hostage in 
order to reap a financial windfall. Furthermore, although each 
case will have its own unique facts, pirates who have committed 
 
230. See, e.g., Lapaix v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 605 F.3d 1138, 1141 n.2 (11th Cir. 2010) 
(“Conviction of a particularly serious crime necessarily renders one a danger to the 
community.” (quoting Zardui-Quintana v. Richard, 768 F.2d 1213, 1222 (11th Cir. 
1985))); Gao v. Holder, 595 F.3d 549, 555 n.1 (4th Cir. 2010) (“[O]nce the particularly 
serious crime determination is made, the alien is ineligible for withholding without a 
separate finding on dangerousness.” (quoting Kofa v. INS, 60 F.3d 1084, 1088 (4th Cir. 
1995) (en banc))). 
231. Zardui-Quintana, 768 F.2d at 1222. 
232. See id. at 1222–23. 
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violent acts will probably have some difficulty convincing a fact 
finder that their prison stay has reformed them—particularly if 
the acts on which their conviction was based were violent in 
nature or if the facts show that they have some other history of 
violence. 
Finally, in states that follow the UNCHR’s requirements for 
applying Article 33(2)’s “danger to the community” exception, 
states should be able to show that removing the pirate is 
necessary and proportionate. First, refoulement will remove the 
pirate from the state, which should thereby eliminate the danger 
of having him in the community. Whether refoulement is the last 
resort will depend on the precise facts of the case, but the 
UNHCR suggests that the state of refuge should consider 
whether prosecution, restrictions on movement (such as 
imprisonment), or removal to a safe third country might just as 
effectively remove the danger posed by the refugee.233 Indefinite 
imprisonment is certainly one option to remove the risk to the 
community posed by convicted pirates, and some states have 
indefinitely imprisoned some asylum seekers.234 However, and 
although the UNHCR recommends it as an alternative to 
removal, the drafters of the Refugee Convention apparently 
assumed the indefinite imprisonment would be no better than 
refoulement.235 As to the safe third country alternative, it may not 
be viable because one might expect that other countries will be 
unwilling to accept into their own communities pirates who have 
been convicted of violent offenses.236 Finally, although each case 
will have unique characteristics, the danger to the community 
will likely outweigh any danger to the pirate upon being refouled. 
Based on the realities of modern piracy, the facts should show 
that the convicted pirate was engaged in armed acts of violence 
against innocent seafarers for financial gain. This is the type of 
person a fact finder should conclude may pose a great danger to 
the community. 
 
233. See UNHCR Request for Advisory Opinion, supra note 215, at 7. 
234. See WOUTERS, supra note 90, at 114 n.484 (citing HATHAWAY, supra note 119, 
at 352). 
235. See id. 
236. Of course, if another safe country does accept the convicted pirate, then the 
pirate will not be granted asylum in the state in which he was convicted. 
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D. Status and Rights under the Refugee Convention 
Because state laws interpreting and implementing the 
Refugee Convention differ, and because states are entitled to 
determine whether refugees are entitled to asylum or residence 
permits, the rights accorded to any pirates who may qualify for 
refugee status under the Refugee Convention will differ 
depending on the laws prevailing in the state in which they are 
seeking refuge.237 For example, pursuant to the EU Qualification 
Directive, Member States must provide “refugees” residence 
permits “which must be valid for at least three years and 
renewable unless compelling reasons of national security or 
public order otherwise require.”238 However, according to Article 
21(3) of the EU Qualification Directive, Member States are not 
required to grant residence permits to refugees who are a 
“danger to the state or community” based on provisions 
equivalent to those found in Article 33(2) of the Refugee 
Convention.239 And, of course, those pirates who cannot 
demonstrate persecution or who meet the Article 1(F) exclusion 
criteria aimed at criminals are not entitled to any benefits 
associated with refugee status. In the United States, as noted 
above, because they have probably committed “serious non-
political crime[s]” or “particularly serious crime[s],” pirates 
should not be eligible for refugee status or protection from 
refoulement.240  
Even if pirates are not refugees, and thus denied protections 
under international refugee law, some convicted pirates, 
 
237. See WOUTERS, supra note 90, at 158 (“The country of refuge has the sovereign 
authority to decide on the legal status of the refugee and the rights attached to such 
status.”). 
238.  Council Directive 2004/83/EC on Minimum Standards for the Qualification 
and Status of Third-country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons who 
Otherwise Need International Protection and the Content of the Protection Granted, 
art. 24(1), 2004 O.J. L 304/20, at 21[hereinafter EU Qualification Directive]. Member 
States may provide greater benefits to refugees if they wish. For example, the United 
Kingdom apparently grants five-year residence permits. See Hugo Storey, EU Refugee 
Qualification Directive: A Brave New World?, 20 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 1, 16 n.45 (2008). 
239. Compare EU Qualification Directive, supra note 238 art. 21(2)–(3), at 20 with 
Refugee Convention, supra note 95, art. 33(2). 
240. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii)–-(iii) (denying asylum to aliens who have 
committed serious non-political offenses outside the United States and to aliens 
convicted of particularly serious crimes); id. § 1231(b (3)(B)(ii)–-(iii) (denying 
protection against refoulement to aliens who have committed serious non-political 
offenses outside the United States and to aliens convicted of particularly serious crimes). 
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however, may be able to seek subsidiary rights to remain or seek 
protection against refoulement under international human rights 
law. The question of whether pirates are likely to succeed in 
establishing such rights is addressed below. 
IV. ARE PIRATES LIKELY TO SUCCEED IN ESTABLISHING A 
RIGHT TO PROTECTION AGAINST REFOULEMENT UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW? 
With respect to the international treaties providing for 
protection against refoulement under international human rights 
law, most pirates should not be able to demonstrate grounds for 
believing they would be subjected to torture or other forms of ill-
treatment if they were returned to their country of origin. As 
discussed in connection with potential claims of persecution, the 
evidence relating to pirates does not indicate they are individuals 
who are subjected to torture or ill-treatment. Rather, pirates 
commit acts of violence against innocent seafarers in the hopes 
of obtaining undeserved financial rewards. In Somalia, the 
evidence further indicates that it is the pirates who are in control 
of the areas where pirates live and operate.241 Even if pirates 
belonged to some minority clan or tribe, their claims of potential 
torture or ill-treatment based on those grounds may be less than 
credible given that they managed to become pirates—and thus, 
the very individuals who are responsible for unprovoked, violent 
acts. Furthermore, the fact that there is generalized violence or a 
pattern of human rights violations in the country is ordinarily not 
enough to warrant protection from refoulement under 
international human rights treaties. Although such circumstances 
may be considered, the individual himself will still have to show 
that he personally is in danger of torture or ill-treatment.242 
A. The United States Example 
In the United States, convicted pirates have limited options 
for seeking protection against refoulement under international 
 
241. See supra notes 190–191 and accompanying text. 
242. See supra notes 126, 171–172 and accompanying text; see also EU Qualification 
Directive, supra note 238, art. 15(c), at 19 (requiring a “serious and individual threat to a 
civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international 
or internal armed conflict” for the individual to qualify for protection under 
international human rights treaty obligations (emphasis added)). 
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human rights law. First, of the three international human rights 
treaties described above, the United States only considers itself 
subject to a non-refoulement obligation under CAT,243 which covers 
only claims of torture, as opposed to ill-treatment; it is not a party 
to the ECHR; and it does not agree that the ICCPR contains a 
non-refoulement obligation.244 To state a claim under CAT in the 
United States, the pirate would have to produce evidence 
showing it is “more likely than not” that he would be tortured if 
returned to his country of origin.245 And because the United 
States is not a party to Article 22 of CAT, individuals cannot bring 
complaints before the Committee against Torture.246 Therefore, 
while the Committee may be able to comment on or criticize the 
determinations made by US courts in cases alleging that an 
individual will be tortured if refouled, the committee can make no 
contrary determination. 
In addition, those convicted of “particularly serious crimes” 
are not only ineligible for asylum in the United States, but they 
are also denied any permanent “withholding of removal” even if 
they are able to show that they face torture in their country of 
origin.247 Such applicants are entitled only to “deferral of 
removal,”248 a status that (1) does not entitle the applicant to 
lawful or permanent immigration status in the United States; (2) 
permits reconsideration if the applicant is no longer subject to 
likely torture; and (3) allows for the possibility of deporting the 
 
243. Congress implemented the obligations flowing from Article 3 of CAT in the 
Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act (“FARRA”) of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 
112 Stat. 2681(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231). FARRA states in pertinent part:  
It shall be the policy of the United States not to expel, extradite, or otherwise 
effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in which there are 
substantial grounds for believing the person would be in danger of being 
subjected to torture, regardless of whether the person is physically present in 
the United States. 
Id. § 2242(a), 112 Stat. 2681–822. 
244. See supra notes 154–155 and accompanying text. 
245. See supra note 132 and accompanying text; see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2) 
(2010); Ghebrehiwot v. Attorney Gen., 467 F.3d 344, 352 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that 
one applying for relief under CAT bears the burden of showing that it is more likely 
than not that he would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal). 
246. See CAT, supra note 96, art. 22. 
247. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(d)(2) (requiring a mandatory denial of withholding of 
removal to applicants convicted of particularly serious crimes, even though they are able 
to establish likely torture upon return to the country of removal). 
248. See id. § 208.17(a). 
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applicant to another safe third country.249 Accordingly, pirates 
convicted of acts such as murder, hijacking, kidnapping, or 
armed robbery would likely be denied any permanent residence 
status in the United States or any permanent protection against 
refoulement even if they could show they would be tortured in 
some particular country of removal.250 
B. The European Union Example 
Pirates convicted in Europe may not fare significantly better 
than those in the United States. It is true that many countries in 
Europe have joined Article 22 of CAT,251 such that individuals are 
entitled to bring claims before the Committee against Torture if 
they have exhausted domestic avenues for relief. Many, but for 
the notable exception of the United Kingdom, are also party to 
the individual complaint procedures under the Optional 
Protocol to the ICCPR.252 In addition, and more importantly 
from a standpoint of enforcement of treaty obligations, all 
Council of Europe member states (which includes all European 
Union Member States) are parties to the ECHR and are 
automatically subject to the jurisdiction of the European Court of 
Human Rights.253 
Nevertheless, even if states may not return individuals to 
states where they would be subjected to torture or ill-treatment in 
violation of these several international human rights treaties, 
states in Europe do not have to provide residence permits to 
persons who have been convicted of serious crimes. Pursuant to 
the EU Qualification Directive, Member States are not required 
to grant refugee status to persons who, because they have 
committed certain types of crimes, would be excludable under 
the Directive’s equivalent of Article 1(F) of the Refugee 
Convention.254 Nor, as noted above, are EU Member States 
required to provide the benefits associated with refugee status to 
refugees who pose a danger to the security of the state or who, 
 
249. See id.. § 208.17(b)(1)(i), (b)(1)(iv), (b)(2). 
250. See supra Part III.C (discussing what constitutes a “particularly serious crime” 
in the United States). 
251. For example, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
and Spain are all parties to Article 22. 
252. See UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, supra note 148. 
253. See supra note 175 and accompanying text. 
254. See EU Qualification Directive, supra note 238, art. 12(2), at 18. 
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“having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly 
serious crime, constitute[] a danger to the community” of the 
Member State.255 Pirates should be excludable as refugees under 
the EU Qualification Directive’s provisions equivalent to Article 
1(F) or excluded from refugee status benefits on the grounds 
that they have been convicted of a crime that causes them to be a 
danger to the community. As such, pirates should not be eligible 
for the three-year residence permit that the EU Qualification 
Directive requires Member States to grant to refugees.256 
The EU Qualification Directive also provides for “subsidiary 
protection” for persons who do not qualify for refugee status but 
are otherwise deserving of international protection because they 
face a real risk of serious harm—including torture, ill-treatment, 
or threat to life because of indiscriminate violence—if returned 
to their country of origin.257 Like refugee status, however, 
subsidiary protection is not available “where there are serious 
reasons for considering that” the person has (1) “committed a 
crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity;” 
(2) “committed a serious crime;” (3) “been guilty of acts 
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations as 
set out in the Preamble and Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter of the 
United Nations;” or (4) “constitutes a danger to the community 
or to the security of the member state in which [he] is 
present.”258 Under Article 17(2), persons who instigate or 
otherwise participate in any of the criminal acts referenced above 
are also ineligible for subsidiary protection and its associated 
benefits.259 Because convicted pirates should at a minimum 
qualify as having committed a “serious crime” under Article 
17(1)(b), they are likely unable to qualify for subsidiary 
 
255. See id. art. 14(4)–(5), at 18. 
256. See id. art. 24(1), at 21 (requiring Member States to issue residence permits 
that must be valid for at least three years and renewable to the refugee unless 
compelling reasons of national security or public order require otherwise). 
257. Id. art. 2(e), at 14, 15, 19. Article 15 states:  
Serious harm consists of: (a) death penalty or execution; or (b) torture or 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of an applicant in the 
country of origin; or (c) serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or 
person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or 
internal armed conflict. 
Id. at 19. 
258. Id. art. 17(1), at 19. 
259. Id. art. 17(2), at 19. 
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protection in the EU—even if they are able to show that they 
would be tortured or ill-treated upon return to their country of 
origin. Of course, if some pirates could show they would be 
tortured or ill-treated (which should be unlikely in most cases), 
EU Member States would not be able to return them to a country 
where that danger exists. But, since the pirates at a minimum 
would have committed a serious crime under Article 17(1)(b), 
states would not be required to grant them the one-year 
renewable residence permit that is available to those who qualify 
for subsidiary protection.260 
It is true that because the EU Qualification Directive sets 
minimum standards for EU Member States, some states may 
provide greater protection for certain reasons and categories of 
persons.261 However, because pirates are probably unable to 
demonstrate substantial grounds for believing they would be 
subjected to serious harm, and would likely be excluded from 
claiming subsidiary status because they have committed violent 
crimes, the EU Qualification Directive would not require states to 
grant them residence permits.262 Whether there are options 
available to allow states to remove convicted pirates from their 
country in the event that the pirates can make a showing of 
serious harm is discussed in the following section. 
C. The Use of Internal Protection Options or Diplomatic Assurances to 
Remove Any Risk of Torture or Ill-Treatment 
In those cases where convicted pirates are able to prove they 
would be subjected to torture or ill-treatment, states may seek to 
remove the pirate and eliminate that risk of harm by using 
internal flight or protection options or diplomatic assurances. 
 
260. See id. art. 24(2), at 21. 
261. See id. art. 1, at 14 (“The purpose of this Directive is to lay down minimum 
standards for the qualification of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees 
or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the 
protection granted.”). 
262. In July 2010, news reports indicated that Seychelles had passed a special law 
allowing easy extradition of the pirates it convicted to Somalia. See Eleven Somali Pirates 
Jailed in Seychelles, RTT NEWS, July 26, 2010, http://www.rttnews.com/
ArticleView.aspx?Id=1370247. Because a copy of the law was not made available, the 
grounds on which it has predicted the extradition of convicted pirates are unknown. 
Presumably, the law will comply with international refugee law and international human 
rights law since Seychelles is a member of CAT, the ICCPR, and the Refugee 
Convention. 
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The internal flight or protection alternative is available where the 
evidence shows that the risk of torture or ill-treatment is limited 
to a particular part of the country, and where the individual 
would be able to enter and remain in another part of the country 
in which the government or an international organization would 
be able to protect him against such treatment.263 Indeed, in 
H.M.H.I. v. Australia,264 the Committee against Torture approved 
the use of an internal protection alternative in a case in which 
the individual claimed a risk of torture in Mogadishu, Somalia. 
The Committee concluded that Australia could return the 
individual to Kenya, where he could take advantage of the 
UNHCR’s voluntary repatriation program and return to a safe 
area within Somalia.265 Of course, the availability of the internal 
protection alternative will depend on the facts of the particular 
case, and it may sometimes be difficult for states to find an 
alternative safe location where a convicted pirate would be 
welcome and protected. 
As to diplomatic assurances that an individual will not be 
tortured or ill-treated upon refoulment,266 whether assurances may 
be relied on to relieve states of their obligations under 
international human rights treaties to protect individuals will also 
depend on the particular circumstances of the case.267 States 
satisfy their human rights obligations only if the diplomatic 
 
263. See, e.g., WOUTERS, supra note 90, at 291–93 (discussing internal protection 
under the ECHR); id. at 398–99 (discussing internal protection under the ICCPR); id. at 
494–96 (discussing internal protection under CAT). 
264. H.M.H.I. v. Australia, No. 177/2001, UNCAT, U.N. Doc. 
CAT/C/28/D/177/2001, ¶ 6.6 (2002). 
265. See id. In the United States, when considering applications for withholding of 
removal, immigration judges are entitled to consider whether there is another location 
in the country of removal where the individual is not likely to be tortured. 8 C.F.R. § 
208.16(c)(3)(ii) (2010). 
266. Assurances can be written undertakings in formal agreements, such as 
memoranda of understanding. Assurances can also be given less formally through 
diplomatic channels. See Gillard, supra note 93, at 742. 
267. See id. at 744 (noting that although the issue of diplomatic assurances has 
come before the European Court of Human Rights and the Committee against Torture, 
neither has adopted a general position on the practice nor condemned it outright, 
preferring instead to consider the matter on a case-by-case basis); see also KALIN & 
KUNZLI, supra note 91, at 497 (stating the same); Kate Jones, Deportations with Assurances: 
Addressing Key Criticisms, 57 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 183, 186 (2008) (arguing that the cases 
before the European Court of Human Rights have not concluded that assurances are 
inherently reliable, but rather assess whether they eliminate the risk of torture based on 
the relevant facts). 
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assurances on which they are relying are “(i) a suitable means to 
eliminate the danger to the individual concerned, and (ii) if the 
sending State may, in good faith, consider them reliable.”268 
Regarding reliability, facts to consider are the general human 
rights situation in the state at the relevant time269 and whether 
the sending state has put in place effective means to monitor 
implementation of the assurances by the receiving state.270 In 
particular, the Committee against Torture recommends that in 
determining whether refoulement is proper under Article 3 of 
CAT, states should only rely on diplomatic assurances from states 
“which do not systematically violate the Convention’s provisions, 
and after a thorough examination of the merits of each 
individual case.”271 It further recommends that states establish 
and implement effective post-return monitoring mechanisms.272 
The European Court of Human Rights similarly focuses on 
the quality of the assurances and the level of monitoring in 
determining whether states violate Article 3 of the ECHR by 
returning applicants to areas where they allege they would be 
subjected to torture or ill-treatment. For example, in Mamatkulov 
v. Turkey, the court found that Turkey did not violate Article 3 
when it extradited two applicants to Uzbekistan based on 
diplomatic assurances from the Uzbek Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs.273 Those assurances were contained in two letters and 
stated that the applicants would not be subjected to torture or 
sentenced to capital punishment and that the country would 
 
268. UNHCR Note on Diplomatic Assurances, supra note 218, at 9 (emphasis in 
original) (citing Agiza v. Sweden, No. 233/2003, UNCAT, U.N. Doc. 
CAT/C/34/D/233/2003, ¶¶ 13.4–13.5 (2005) and Chahal v. United Kingdom, 1996-V 
Eur. Ct. H.R. 1831). 
269. See id. 
270. See Alzery v. Sweden, Commn’c No. 1416/2005, UNHRC, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/88/D/1416/2005, ¶ 11.5 (Nov. 10, 2006) (finding assurances insufficient 
where they contained no mechanism for monitoring their enforcement and where no 
arrangements were otherwise made for monitoring outside the text of the assurances). 
271. See UNCAT, Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee against 
Torture: United States of America, ¶ 21, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (July 25, 2006). 
272. See id. The Human Rights Committee has also commented that where torture 
is systematic in a country, the less likely it is that the real risk of torture can be 
eliminated by diplomatic assurances. Like the Committee against Torture, it also 
recommends that states adopt clear and effective mechanisms to effectively monitor the 
treatment of individuals removed in accordance with diplomatic assurances. See U.N. 
Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: 
United States of America, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1 (Dec. 18, 2006). 
273. Mamatkulov v. Turkey, 2005-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 225, 322. 
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abide by its obligations under CAT.274 Turkish diplomats were 
also permitted to visit the applicants in prison after their 
convictions and found them to be in good health.275 On the 
other hand, the court has found assurances ineffective to 
alleviate the risk that the applicant will be tortured where the 
assurances were not specific or where they were outweighed by 
other contrary evidence—such as where the practice of torture is 
endemic or tolerated by the authorities.276 
Nevertheless, and notwithstanding that their use has been 
criticized,277 states frequently rely on diplomatic assurances.278 
Assurances allow states to ensure that persons they return are not 
subjected to torture or other ill-treatment. At the same time, 
assurances allow states to remove persons who do not satisfy the 
requirements for obtaining residence. In the United States, for 
 
274. See id. at 303. 
275. See id. at 307. 
276. See Saadi v. Italy, App. No. 37201/66, ¶¶ 143, 148 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 28, 
2008) http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/47c6882e2.html (where the Tunisian 
government stated in response to a request for assurances that its laws guaranteed 
prisoner’s rights and that Tunisia was a member of relevant international treaties but, 
such as Amnesty International reports, showed evidence of widespread torture by or 
tolerated by the authorities). 
277. See, e.g., Special Rapporteur on Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Interim Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and 
other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, ¶ 51, U.N. Doc. A/60/316 
(Aug. 30, 2005) [hereinafter Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur]. In his 2005 report to 
the UN General Assembly, the Special Rapporteur strongly criticized the practice of 
relying on diplomatic assurances, which he argued are unreliable and ineffective in 
protecting against torture and ill-treatment. Among other things, he expressed the view 
that such assurances tend to be sought from states that systematically practice torture; 
that post-return monitoring mechanisms do not guarantee against torture; and that 
assurances are either not legally binding or cannot be enforced by the state receiving 
them. See id. ¶¶ 46, 51. States, however, have responses to these concerns. Kate Jones, 
Assistant Legal Adviser at the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office, explains that the 
UK’s policy of relying on diplomatic assurances is actually a way of ensuring that it 
complies with human rights obligations, rather than avoiding them. See Jones, supra note 
267, at 185–88. She notes that even though some assurances in the past have proven to 
be unreliable, the United Kingdom now builds protections into its assurances—in 
particular, independent monitoring arrangements. As to the fact that agreements are 
with states that have poor records, she acknowledges that assurances would not be 
required if there was not some question about how states would treat the returned 
individuals. See id. at 186–88. Nevertheless, she suggests that it does not follow that 
assurances from such states are inherently unreliable, particularly since the agreements 
are made at the highest possible levels of government and failure to comply with such 
political commitments could seriously damage diplomatic relations with the sending 
country or subject the receiving state to negative publicity. See id. at 187–88. 
278. UNHCR Note on Diplomatic Assurances, supra note 218, at 2. 
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example, reliable diplomatic assurances that a person would not 
be tortured if returned to that state permit the government to 
permanently remove a person whose removal otherwise would be 
deferred.279 
While diplomatic assurances are usually sought on an 
individual basis, recently states have begun negotiating more 
general agreements to the effect that the persons deported to a 
particular country will not be subjected to human rights 
violations (which can thereafter be supplemented by specific 
assurances in the case of a particular individual). The United 
Kingdom has entered into general agreements for assurances 
with Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Libya and those agreements 
typically allow for an independent human rights body to monitor 
implementation of the assurances.280 
Whether the European Court of Human Rights or domestic 
courts will conclude that these agreements are sufficient to 
ensure that deportees’ rights under Article 3 of the ECHR will 
not be violated, however, is unclear.281 In an appeal by two 
Libyans the United Kingdom sought to deport, the UK Special 
Immigration Appeals Commission (“SIAC”), concluded that, 
although diplomatic assurances are capable of reducing a risk of 
breaching Article 3 of the ECHR, even the detailed protections 
contained in the agreement with Libya282 were not enough to 
prevent ill-treatment.283 In particular, the SIAC expressed 
concerns about the chosen monitoring body; the unreliability 
and unpredictability of Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Qadafi; 
the absence of civil society to shame the government into 
compliance; and the newness of the United Kingdom’s 
 
279. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(c) (2010). 
280. See Jones, supra note 267, at 184. 
281. See Ashley Deeks, Am. Soc’y of Int’l Law, Promises Not to Torture: Diplomatic 
Assurances in U.S. Courts, 56–60 (Dec. 2008) (discussing litigation brought by individuals 
challenging their deportation and the quality of the diplomatic assurances contained in 
agreements with Algeria, Jordan, and Libya). 
282. Memorandum of Understanding between the General People’s Committee 
for Foreign Liaison and International Co-Operation of the Great Socialist People’s 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning the Provision of Assurances 
in Respect of Persons Subject to Deportation, Libya-U.K., Oct. 18, 2005, available at 
http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/libya-mou. 
283. See generally DD v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2007] UKSIAC Nos. 
SC/42/2005 & SC/50/2005 (U.K.). 
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diplomatic relationship with Libya.284 By contrast, in a number of 
cases brought by Algerians contesting their deportations, the 
SIAC concluded that the Algerian government had negotiated 
the assurances agreement with the United Kingdom in good faith 
and that diplomatic pressure by the United Kingdom would help 
enforce the assurances.285 The SIAC emphasized the domestic 
situation in Algeria, which it noted had improved to the extent 
that there was less violence and a decrease in abuses by security 
forces.286 
In sum, whether a state can use diplomatic assurances to aid 
it in removing any pirates who do not satisfy residency 
requirements (because, for example, they have been convicted of 
serious crimes) but are able to establish that they face a risk of 
torture in the country of removal will depend on the particular 
circumstances of the case. However, assurances are certainly an 
available option where the state of return is one that does not 
systematically practice or condone torture. And, if the pirate’s 
state of origin is one that does systematically practice torture, 
states can seek to return the pirate to a neighboring state with 
better practices.287 In all cases, states should be able to negotiate 
diplomatic assurances that will be effective in removing the risk 
of torture or ill-treatment: assurances must be specific, and the 
sending state must put in place an effective post-removal 
monitoring system. 
CONCLUSION 
The language of the relevant international treaties, 
interpretations of that language, and state practice all generally 
indicate that pirates who are convicted of violent crimes should 
not be eligible for asylum or complementary forms of protection 
against refoulement. As to refugee status under the Refugee 
Convention, most pirates are probably unable to show that they 
 
284. See id. ¶¶ 317, 319, 346, 348, 368–71. 
285. See Deeks, supra note 280, at 59–60. 
286. See Y v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2006] UKSIAC No. SC/36/2005, ¶ 
3 (U.K.). 
287.  It may be difficult to convince states that are not otherwise responsible for the 
pirate to accept him in their community. However, many things are possible with 
diplomacy. After all, as noted above, Kenya, Mauritius, Seychelles, and Tanzania have all 
reached agreements with a number of other countries to accept captured pirates for 
jailing and prosecution. See supra notes 12–14 and accompanying text. 
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would be persecuted because of their race, nationality, political 
opinion, or membership in a particular group if returned to their 
country of origin. Furthermore, convicted pirates will have 
committed the kinds of violent crimes that should exclude them 
from refugee status and, accordingly, from being granted asylum 
and the benefits associated with it, such as residence permits. 
Even if pirates are not excluded from refugee status, states may 
not have to protect them against refoulement under the Refugee 
Convention on the grounds that they have been convicted of a 
particularly serious crime that causes them to be a danger to the 
community in which they are seeking refuge. 
Nor should pirates generally be able to claim protection 
against refoulement under the relevant international human rights 
treaties. First, there is little reason to believe that most pirates 
would be able to state and prove a claim that they would be 
subjected to torture or ill-treatment if returned to their country 
of origin. Even if some could, however, the laws of the United 
States and the European Union provide that persons who have 
been convicted of, or committed, certain serious crimes—like the 
violent crimes pirates would have committed—are not eligible 
for residence permits. Furthermore, even though such persons 
cannot be refouled to face torture or ill-treatment, their deferral 
of removal in the United States is only temporary, and removal 
may recommence if circumstances change. Moreover, in both the 
United States and Europe, states can seek reliable diplomatic 
assurances with monitoring mechanisms in order to remove the 
risk of torture and allow convicted pirates to be deported to their 
countries of origin. If the country of origin is not an available 
option, states can seek to remove pirates to other safe countries. 
Accordingly, although states that convict pirates may face 
additional asylum claims, and although each factual 
circumstance is unique, assuming pirates have committed violent 
crimes, those asylum claims are likely to be unsuccessful—at least 
in terms of gaining the pirate residence in the country of 
conviction. 
Of course, the mere fact of additional asylum claims that 
need to be investigated, considered, and adjudicated is a burden 
on states. The issue of what to do with pirates who are not 
eligible for residency, but who cannot be refouled because they 
have been able to show they would be subjected to torture or ill-
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treatment if returned, also poses a burden on states. It may be 
difficult to obtain reliable diplomatic assurances from the state of 
origin, and it may also be difficult to find another safe country 
willing to accept into its community a convicted pirate. 
Nevertheless, the risk of asylum claims and the difficulties 
associated with adjudicating them are burdens that developed 
nations face in any event. During 2008, the United States granted 
asylum to about 20,500 persons and resettled another 60,200 
refugees from other countries.288 Canada received 34,800 
applications for asylum in 2008, and granted 7550.289 The EU 
Member States received 238,400 requests for asylum during 
2008.290 Regarding Somalia in particular, UNHCR reports that 
there were some 700,000 refugees from that country in 2009 
alone.291 And, in 2008, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States received more than 3000 claims each from Somalis 
seeking refuge.292 Together, the EU Member States received 
approximately 14,300 requests for asylum by Somalis during 
2008.293 Nations face and accept asylum claims like these because 
they are developed and follow the rule of law—making them a 
place where less-privileged individuals seek refuge. 
Developed nations also willingly accept the risk of additional 
asylum claims in fulfilling goals they otherwise view as 
worthwhile. For example, states accept the risk of asylum claims 
or non-refoulement claims when they engage in armed conflict and 
capture prisoners. The various state military forces operating in 
Afghanistan and Iraq must regularly face questions about 
whether their transfer of detainees will violate the principle of 
non-refoulement.294 States also seek to have foreign nationals 
 
288. See World Refugee Survey 2009, Country Reports: United States, U.S. COMM. FOR 
REFUGEES AND IMMIGRANTS [USCRI], http://www.refugees.org/countryreports.aspx? 
id=2365 (last visited Dec. 1, 2010). 
289. See World Refugee Survey 2009, Country Reports: Canada, USCRI, 
http://www.refugees.org/countryreports.aspx?id=2321 (last visited Dec. 1, 2010). 
290. See World Refugee Survey 2009, Country Reports: Europe, USCRI, 
http://www.refugees.org/countryreports.aspx?id=2327 (last visited Dec. 1, 2010). 
291. See UNHCR Somalia Eligibility Guidelines, supra note 185, at 2 (reporting that 
the number of Somali asylum-seekers and refugees has jumped from approximately 
485,000 in 2006 to over 700,000 by the end of 2009). 
292. See World Refugee Survey 2009, USCRI, available at http://www.refugees.org/
FTP/WRS09PDFS/RefuandAsylumseek.pdf. 
293. See World Refugee Survey 2009: Country Reports Europe, supra note 290. 
294. See Gillard, supra note 93, at 704–05. 
  
2011] PIRATES AND ASYLUM 295 
extradited in order to stand trial in their country where the 
foreign national has committed crimes in the country or which 
affect its citizens. 
Captured pirates should not be able to escape justice simply 
because developed nations do not wish to deal with a relatively 
few additional asylum claims. Prosecuting pirates who have 
committed violent acts that disrupt international transport and 
harm innocent seafarers is necessary to actually deter pirates 
from continuing to commit those violent crimes.295 In the current 
culture of impunity, where pirates are captured and then 
released, pirates are learning that crime pays huge ransoms. 
Prosecutions of more pirates can help to teach pirates a different 
lesson. Developed nations generally have the resources, 
institutions, and expertise to permit them to try captured pirates 
in their domestic courts. They should also be able to conduct 
those trials fairly and in accordance with processes that respect 
human rights.296 Bringing pirates to justice and deterring future 
acts of piracy is a goal at least as worthy as others which have 
caused nations to consider asylum claims—a goal that developed 
nations should embrace rather than seek to avoid. 
 
295. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
296. By contrast, the solution of sending pirates to Kenya to be jailed and 
prosecuted has been criticized on the grounds, among others, that Kenya has a corrupt 
and slow judicial system that does not respect the human rights of its prisoners. For a 
summary of some of these criticisms, see Dutton, supra note 26, at 224–26. 
